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Article 
  
Rejection, Revocation of Acceptance, and 
Avoidance: A Comparative Assessment of UCC 
and CISG Goods Oriented Remedies 
 
Sarah Howard Jenkins* 
 
Commercial parties purchase goods for use in their trade 
or business or for resale. Their primary objective is to obtain 
conforming goods of the desired quality at a price that 
generates a profitable return on the resale or use of the 
purchased goods. Occasionally, the seller delivers non-
conforming goods, goods that fail to meet the contractual 
obligation. This obligation may arise from the seller’s 
description,1 statements,2 promises,3 practices,4 the course of 
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 1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods art. 35, Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
CISG] (“The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and 
description required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in 
the manner required by the contract . . . .”); U.C.C. § 2–313(1) (2011) (“Express 
warranties by the seller are created [by a]ny description of the goods which is 
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the 
goods shall conform to the description.”). 
 2. U.C.C. § 2–313(1)(a) (2011) (“Express warranties by the seller are 
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dealings and the course of performance5 between the parties, or 
from trade usage or trade custom.6 The Uniform Commercial 
Code (“Code”) and the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (“Convention”) empower the 
buyer to thrust the non-conforming or defective goods back onto 
the seller. Although the Code and the Convention contain 
similar language regarding the buyer’s ability to return 
defective goods, the buyer’s rights and the seller’s 
corresponding duties vary in significant ways. An assessment 
of these rights and duties is essential for crafting an agreement 
that minimizes the adverse impact of the Convention on parties 
who might otherwise be subject to it, while still reaping the 
benefits available in the Convention but absent from the Code. 
This article addresses the rights available to buyers pursuant 
to the domestic sales law of Rejection,7 Revocation of 
Acceptance,8 and the comparable right of Avoidance9 available 
 
created [by a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer 
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates 
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or 
promise.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (“The parties are bound by any usage to 
which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established 
between themselves.”) (emphasis added). 
 5. U.C.C. § 1–201(3) (2011) (“‘Agreement,’ as distinguished from 
‘contract’, means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language 
or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course 
of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in Section 1–303.”). 
 6. CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(2) (“The parties are considered, unless 
otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its 
formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known and 
which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, 
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.”); 
U.C.C. § 1–201(3) (2011). 
 7. U.C.C. § 2–601 (2011) (“[I]f the goods or the tender of delivery fail in 
any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may (a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or (c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the 
rest.”).  
 8. Id. § 2–608 (“The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or 
commercial unit whose non–conformity substantially impairs its value to him 
if he has accepted it (a) on the reasonable assumption that its non–conformity 
would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or (b) without discovery 
of such non–conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the 
difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances. (2) 
Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer 
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any 
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own 
defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it. (3) A buyer 
who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods 
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through the Convention. First, this article will assess the rights 
granted to, and limitations imposed on, buyers by the Code. 
Second, after establishing these rights and the conditions 
precedent to the exercise of them, the rights and obligations of 
the Convention will be assessed through a comparative lens.  
Parallelism between the rights and obligations contained 
in these two sources of law are obvious. Both permit the buyer 
to return defective goods, but the conditions and standards 
applicable for determining the right to do so vary. Both permit 
defaulting sellers to cure or correct their failures in performing 
if the goods are delivered in advance of the time for 
performance or after the delivery date. However, the conditions 
that authorize the exercise of the right to cure and the buyer’s 
obligation to permit cure are distinguishable. For instance, 
buyers in contracts that require delivery in separate lots, and 
who are subject to the Code, will face different standards if the 
buyer seeks to reject a defective installment rather than the 
whole contract.10 Yet a similarly situated buyer subject to the 
Convention will use the same standard for rejecting a defective 
installment as it would for rejecting future installments.11 
Contrary to the pronouncement by some United States courts, 
the Code does not inform the interpretation and application of 
the Convention.12 The Convention is an autonomous body of 
principles that do not reflect in total any pre-existing legal 
 
involved as if he had rejected them.”).  
 9. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49 (“The buyer may declare the contract 
avoided: (a) If the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under 
the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; 
or (b) In case of non–delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the 
additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) 
of article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed. (2) 
However, in cases where the seller has delivered the goods, the buyer loses the 
right to declare the contract avoided unless he does so: (a) In respect of late 
delivery, within a reasonable time after he has become aware that delivery 
has been made; (b) In respect of any breach other than late delivery, within a 
reasonable time: (i) After he knew or ought to have known of the breach; (ii) 
After the expiration of any additional period of time fixed by the buyer in 
accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47, or after the seller has declared 
that he will not perform his obligations within such an additional period; or 
(iii) After the expiration of any additional period of time indicated by the seller 
in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 48, or if the buyer refuses to accept 
performance by the seller in accordance with those articles, the buyer may not 
reduce the price.”).  
 10. See U.C.C. § 2–612 (2011). 
 11. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 73. 
 12. Id. art. 7(1).  
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regime.13 
 
I. CONTEXTUAL DELINEATION OF THE RELATIVE 
RIGHTS 
A buyer who is confronted with a non-conforming tender or 
delivery has several choices: keep the goods as delivered and 
seek damages for the difference between the value of the goods 
as warranted and the value of those delivered and accepted;14 
permit the seller to repair or cure the delivery or the tendered 
goods;15 reject the goods to push the goods back onto the seller 
and seek substitute goods from third parties16 or the breaching 
seller17 and damages;18 or seek damages even though substitute 
goods are not acquired.19 Indeed, both the Code20 and the 
Convention21 recognize a seller’s right to cure if the delineated 
conditions are met and reflect a policy preference for 
maintaining the contractual relationship and encouraging 
adjustments between the parties to minimize damages and 
needless costs.  
 
A.  A SELLER’S RIGHT TO CURE – THE CODE’S APPROACH 
The Code permits the seller to cure if: 1) the time for the 
seller’s performance has not expired or 2) the seller had reason 
to believe that the tendered goods would be acceptable to the 
 
 13. See id.; see also Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in 
International Uniform Law Via Autonomous Interpretation: Software 
Contracts and the CISG, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 303 (1996). 
 14. CISG, supra note 1, art. 50; U.C.C. § 2–714 (2011). 
 15. CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1); U.C.C. § 2–508 (2011). 
 16. CISG, supra note 1, art. 75; U.C.C. § 2–712 (2011). 
 17. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2). 
 18. Id. arts. 49, 74; U.C.C. §§ 2–601, 2–712 (2011). 
 19. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 49, 76; U.C.C. §§ 2–601, 2–713 (2011). 
 20. U.C.C. § 2–508 (2011) (“Where any tender or delivery by the seller is 
rejected because non–conforming and the time for performance has not yet 
expired, the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and 
may then within the contract time make a conforming delivery . . . [w]here the 
buyer rejects a non–conforming tender which the seller had reasonable 
grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance the 
seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time 
to substitute a conforming tender.”). 
 21. CISG, supra note 1, art. 48 (“Subject to article 49, the seller may, even 
after the date for delivery, remedy at his own expense any failure to perform 
his obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without 
causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of 
reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. However, the 
buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this Convention.”).  
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buyer.22 Domestic law limits the opportunity to cure to sellers 
who tender early, receive notice of rejection before the time for 
performance of the contract has expired, and notify the buyer of 
their intent to cure.23 This limitation facilitates the buyer’s 
need to identify alternative sources of supply, minimize its risk 
of non–performance of forward contractual obligations, and 
permits needed adjustments to its production schedule, if any, 
in conservation of its resources. The seller has the right to cure, 
but the limited time frame reduces the number of sellers who 
will likely qualify for this right.24 Performing in advance of the 
obligated date of performance is contrary to Just-in-Time 
(“JIT”) manufacturing and lean production, management 
processes that eliminate waste, maximize efficiency, and 
increase value for customers.25 The goal for the seller is 
delivery “just in time,” neither early nor late.26 Early delivery 
generates waste for the buyers by increasing costs for storage, 
handling, and insurance. Delivering early also creates a course 
of performance and, potentially, a course of dealings that, over 
time, may result in an implied term of the contract obligating 
the seller to perform in advance of the agreed upon delivery 
 
 22. U.C.C. § 2–508 (2011). 
 23. See, e.g., Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455 (M.D. Pa. 1972) 
(finding that the seller’s offer to deliver 600 Scotch Pine trees to the buyer on 
December 14, 1967 was a valid exercise of the seller’s right to cure because the 
seller seasonably notified the buyer of its intent to do so, and due to an 
extension of the delivery date, the time for performance had not yet expired). 
But see Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Olympic Foundry Co., 565 P.2d 819 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1977) (relying on the repair warranty period rather than delivery 
date to determine the amount of time the seller had to cure a defect).  
 24. See Telephone Interview with Dr. Karen Leonard, Chair of 
Department of Management, University of Arkansas–Little Rock (Aug. 15, 
2012) (“Early performance typically does not happen in the manufacturing 
setting in large part because the manufacturer will have so much of its assets 
tied up in pre–processed inventory such that early performance, even if it were 
possible, would be a waste of time.”). 
 25. See Richard E. White et al., JIT Manufacturing: A Survey of 
Implementations in Small and Large U.S. Manufacturers, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1 
(1999) (observing that since 1980 U.S. manufacturers have accelerated the 
rate of “just in time” implementation); Francis Quinn, The Lion of Lean: An 
Interview with James Womack, SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. REV., July 1, 2005, at 
28; see also James P. Womack et al., LEAN THINKING (Simon & Schuster 
(1996); JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 
153-162 (Rawson Associates et al. 1990). 
 26. See Telephone Interview with Dr. Joe T. Felan, Associate Professor of 
Management, University of Arkansas–Little Rock (Aug. 30, 2012) (explaining 
“just in time performance” as well as supply chain and production 
management). 
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date and hampering the seller’s production processes.27 The 
second category of sellers who qualify for the right to cure are 
those who are knowledgeable about the quality–range of goods 
that are acceptable in the buyer’s business or industry, or who 
have a course of dealings with the buyer, and who believe that 
the goods tendered, which do not strictly conform to the 
contract, will be acceptable to the buyer with or without a 
money allowance.28 This latter category of sellers has been 
interpreted to include those who are unaware of the non-
conformity of the goods, if they reasonably believe that the 
goods are conforming at the time of tender, but are later 
notified that a breach occurred.29 This interpretation broadens 
the right to cure a non-conforming delivery and allows a 
defaulting seller to make conforming tender at “a further 
reasonable time” rather than the contract date of 
performance.30 Put another way, a seller that acts in good faith 
and tenders goods it reasonably believes are acceptable to the 
buyer will have additional time to cure the defect and avoid a 
breach of contract. Such an interpretation facilitates the Code’s 
policy goal of maintaining contractual relationships and 
conforms, an otherwise rigid legal principle, to reasonable 
commercial behavior.31 This interpretation of Section 2–508 of 
the Code only excludes those sellers who knowingly tender 
non–conforming goods without a reasonable belief that the 
buyer would accept the goods with or without a money 
 
 27. See U.C.C. § 1–303(a), (b), (f) (2011). 
 28. See generally WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
SERIES § 2–508:3 (Linda J. Rusch updating, Frederick H. Miller ed., 2012) 
(WL, Hawkland’s Uniform Commercial Code Series) [hereinafter HAWKLAND] 
(“[O]rdinarily the parties to a commercial transaction are willing to depart 
somewhat from strict compliance with the sales contract, frequently handling 
any discrepancies in performance by money allowances or cure.”).  
 29. See T.W. Oil v. Consol. Edison Co., 443 N.E.2d 932 (N.Y. 1982); Bartus 
v. Riccardi, 55 Misc.2d 3 (Utica City Ct. 1967); see generally William H. 
Lawrence, Appropriate Standards for a Buyer's Refusal to Keep Goods 
Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1670–71 (1994) (“The right 
to cure protects the seller against ‘surprise’ rejections, and the ‘reasonable 
grounds’ limitation protects the buyer from improper allegations of surprise.”). 
 30. U.C.C. § 2–508 (2011). 
 31. See T.W. Oil, 443 N.E.2d at 939 (quoting James J. White & Robert R. 
Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §8–4, at 322–324 (2d. ed. 1980)) 
(“[T]he code intended cure to be a ‘remedy which should be carefully cultivated 
and developed by the courts’ because it ‘offers the possibility of conforming the 
law to reasonable expectations and of thwarting the chiseler who seeks to 
escape from a bad bargain.”).  
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allowance.32 Despite the more expansive reading of Section 2–
508 of the Code, the right to cure granted by the Code does not 
approximate the right to cure available to sellers via the 
Convention. The Code grants the seller a right to cure and does 
not permit the buyer to restrict the seller’s cure if the seller 
gives seasonable notice of its intention to cure.33 Absent a 
contract term to the contrary, under the Code, the buyer must 
permit the seller to cure if the goods are rejected and the seller 
satisfies the conditions precedent to the exercise of the right.34 
Although recent authority suggests the seller must be afforded 
an opportunity to cure the defective goods as a condition to 
revocation of acceptance,35 neither the Code nor prevailing case 
law recognize the seller’s right to cure after the buyer’s 
revocation of acceptance of the goods.36 Here, the non–
conformity involves a substantial impairment of the value of 
the goods to the buyer37 and the buyer’s acceptance was 
 
 32. See McKenzie v. Alla–Ohio Coals, Inc., 29 UCC Rep.Serv. 852 (1979) 
(finding that the seller did not have reasonable grounds to believe its coal 
would be acceptable to the buyer, and therefore, could not rely on U.C.C. § 2–
508 to remedy buyer’s rejection of the defective goods). 
 33. See U.C.C. § 2–508 (2011). 
 34. See Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. 1967) (holding that the 
buyer could not rescind the contract when the buyer refused to allow the seller 
to cure the defect); Beco, Inc. v. Minnechaug Golf Course, 256 A.2d 522 (Conn. 
Cir. Ct. 1968) (deciding that buyer’s failure to make an effective rejection of 
non–conforming goods implicitly constituted acceptance thus limiting the 
damages buyer could recover). But see Marine Mart, Inc. v. Pearce, 480 S.W.2d 
133 (Ark. 1972) (upholding the lower court’s rescission of a contract for non–
conforming goods because determining what equates to effective revocation of 
acceptance is a fact–sensitive process). 
 35. See Mercury Marine v. Clear River Const., 839 So.2d 508, 512 (Miss. 
2003) (quoting Fitzner Pontiac–Buick–Cadillac v. Smith, 523 So.2d 324, 328 
(Miss. 1988)) (“The law’s policy of minimization of economic waste strongly 
supports recognition of a reasonable opportunity to cure. . . . [C]ure is not 
excluded by Section 75–2–608.”) (emphasis added by quoting opinion). 
 36. U.C.C. § 2–608 (2011) (“The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot 
or commercial unit whose non–conformity substantially impairs its value to 
him if he has accepted it (a) on the reasonable assumption that its non–
conformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or (b) without 
discovery of such non–conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced 
either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's 
assurances.”); see Bowen v. Foust, 925 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) 
(recognizing that U.C.C. § 2–508 does not apply to revocation of acceptance); 
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8–5 at 
467 (4th ed. 1995). 
 37. See Inn Between, Inc. v. Remanco Metro, 662 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013 
(Nassau Co. Dist. Ct. 1997) (stating that the non–conformities were so 
substantial and required buyer to call for repair so many times that buyer 
could revoke acceptance); Wilk Paving, Inc. v. Southworth–Milton, Inc., 649 
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induced by a reasonable assumption that the non-conformity 
would be cured, or by the difficulty of discovering the defect 
before acceptance, or by the seller’s assurances.38 
Consequently, the seller’s right to cure under the Code arises 
when the buyer rejects the goods, but the Code imposes no duty 
to cure. 
  
1.  Cure – The Convention 
In contrast to the limited scope of the right to cure under 
the Code, the Convention permits all sellers to cure any failure 
at their own expense, including a fundamental breach or 
material breach – a breach equivalent to a substantial 
impairment of the value of the goods.39 A failure may be cured 
 
A.2d 778, 781–82 (Vt. 1994) (holding that the right to cure “has limits,” and a 
buyer can revoke acceptance after multiple malfunctions and failed attempts 
at a repair). 
 38. See Gramling v. Baltz, 485 S.W.2d 183, (Ark. 1972) (holding that 
buyer did not waive his revocation of acceptance remedy when he continued to 
use his truck after seller’s assurances and attempts at repairs); Mercedes–
Benz of North America Inc. v. Norman Gershman’s Things to Wear, Inc., 596 
A.2d 1358 (Del. 1991) (upholding the trial court’s finding that buyer’s delayed 
revocation of acceptance was permissible because of seller’s repeated 
assurances that the defect would be cured); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & 
Shovel, Inc., 192 N.W.2d 580, 589–90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (finding buyer’s 
revocation of acceptance may not have been timely under normal 
circumstances, but there is an exception for cases involving complex and 
expensive machinery, such as the defective crane at issue); Funk v. 
Montgomery AMC/JEEP/Renault, 586 N.E.2d 1113 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) 
(finding that the seasonal nature of the vehicle’s defect hampered the buyer’s 
ability to discover the defect and revoke acceptance).  
 39. CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1); see Cour d’Appel de Grenoble, Chambre 
Commerciale [CA] [appeals court] Apr. 26, 1995, RG 93/4879 (Fr.), English 
abstract available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=109 (holding that the 
buyer of a used warehouse was entitled to the repair of defects, to the extent 
that the warehouse would conform to the buyers original purchase, but the 
buyer was not entitled to a new warehouse); Oberlandesgericht Koblenz [OLG] 
[provincial court of appeals] Jan. 31, 1997, 2 U 31/96 (Ger.), English abstract 
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=223 (holding that low quality 
goods do not constitute a fundamental breach when seller offers to deliver new 
goods and such a delivery would not cause unreasonable inconvenience to the 
buyer); Landgericht Regensburg [LG] [district courts] Sept. 24, 1998, 6 U 
107/98 (Ger.), English abstract available at http://www.unilex.info/ 
case.cfm?id=507 (finding that buyer could not assert avoidance of the contract 
because it did not specify the defect of the fabrics and deprived the seller of its 
right to cure); Handelsgericht des Kantons Zürich [HG] [commercial court] 
Feb. 10, 1999, HG 970238.1 (Switz.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=484 (holding that when a buyer refuses the 
seller's offer to cure, and a later delivery date would not result in a material 
breach, the buyer is no longer entitled to price reduction). But see United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Digest of case 
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“even after the date for delivery,”40 if the seller can do so 
without unreasonable delay41 and without causing the buyer 
unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement.42 
A solvent seller who provides a record43 or data message44 
promising to indemnify the buyer for expenses incurred as a 
result of the breach should remove any uncertainty that the 
buyer may have regarding reimbursement.45 The buyer retains 
the right to claim damages that resulted from the non-
conforming tender, including its expenses.46 This right to cure 
after the date of delivery is in addition to the right to cure if the 
seller delivers early.47 The seller’s broad right to cure under the 
 
law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 158 
(2008) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Digest] (explaining that while a breach is 
“rarely fundamental” if it can easily be repaired, a buyer’s right to avoidance 
because of a fundamental breach is not subject to the seller’s right to cure).  
 40. CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1). 
 41. See, e.g., Amtsgericht München [AG] [petty district court] June 23, 
1995, 271 C 18968/94 (Ger.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=147 (finding that buyer was permitted to 
recover damages when buyer had to remedy defect on its own in order to 
prevent further economic injury to its customers from seller’s delay).  
 42. See Markus Müller–Chen, Article 48, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN 
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 733, 736–37 (Ingeborg 
Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010) (explaining that a buyer may incur costs for 
arranging the return of the goods for repair or for having to suspend 
production while the seller repairs defective goods); see also CISG, supra note 
1, art. 37 (describing the seller’s right to cure if the seller delivered goods 
before the delivery date); Ingeborg Schwenzer, Article 37, in COMMENTARY ON 
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 601, 605 
(Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3rd ed. 2010). 
 43. U.C.C. § 1–201(31) (2011) (‘“Record’ means information that is 
inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other 
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.”).  
 44. United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications 
in International Contracts art. 4(c), UN Doc. A/60/515. Nov. 23 2005 
[hereinafter Electronic Communications Convention] (“Data message’ means 
information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, magnetic, optical 
or similar means, including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange, 
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.”). 
 45. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1); Markus Müller–Chen, supra note 
42, at 737 (explaining that a seller’s right to cure may be dependent on 
providing security for costs or an assurance of its responsibility if the buyer 
doubts the seller’s willingness or ability to reimburse the buyer). 
 46. See Cour d’Appel de Grenoble, Chambre Commerciale ([CA] [appeals 
court] Apr. 26, 1995, RG 93/4879 (Fr.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=109.  
 47. CISG, supra note 1, art. 37 (“If the seller has delivered goods before 
the date for delivery, he may, up to that date, deliver any missing part or 
make up any deficiency in the quantity of the goods delivered, or deliver goods 
in replacement of any non–conforming goods delivered or remedy any lack of 
JENKINS - RejRevAvoid (22 MINN J INTL L 152 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:50 PM 
2013]    REJECTION, REVOCATION, AND AVOIDANCE  161 
 
Convention is subject to two limitations that may be exercised 
by the buyer: 1) the buyer’s prior notice of avoidance—
cancellation of the contract—that only arises if the breach by 
the seller is a fundamental one,48 or 2) the buyer’s notice of its 
refusal to permit the seller to perform in response to the seller’s 
prior notice of its intention to remedy its performance.49 The 
Convention grants the seller broader rights to cure than the 
Code and empowers the buyer to bar the seller from exercising 
that right. Furthermore, unlike the Code, the Convention also 
empowers the buyer with a right to demand a cure.50 
A buyer may require the seller to repair the non–
conforming goods or to tender substitute goods,51 if the demand 
is made at the same time the buyer gives its notice of the 
nature of the non-conformity of the tendered goods or a 
reasonable time thereafter.52 This right to require the delivery 
of substitute goods, or the repair of defect, is unparalleled 
under the Code as a default provision, and for the right to be 
effective under the Code it must be extracted as part of the 
bargain in fact between the parties.53 The right to require a 
distant seller to repair or to deliver a substitute tender is a 
valuable one for buyers who have a special need for custom or 
scarce goods, whose production schedule requires an 
uninterrupted flow of the goods, or whose contract right to 
purchase is as a long term contract.  
 
conformity in the goods delivered, provided that the exercise of this right does 
not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense. 
However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this 
Convention.”). 
 48. See id. arts. 25, 49. 
 49. See id. art. 48(2), (3), (4); Case No. 7531 of 1994 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.), 
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=139 (holding that buyer could 
avoid the contract because of a fundamental breach and seller’s offer to 
substitute goods after the breach required the buyer’s consent). 
 50. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(3) (“If the goods do not conform with the 
contract, the buyer may require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by 
repair, unless this is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances. A 
request for repair must be made either in conjunction with notice given under 
article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.”) (emphasis added). 
 51. See Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG] [provincial court of appeals] June 
9, 1995, 11 U 191/94 (Ger.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=130 (holding that the seller had to bear the 
costs of substitution or repair of non–conforming windows and the buyer had a 
right to be reimbursed for the costs of installation expenses).  
 52. For a discussion on buyer’s duty of prompt inspection and notice of the 
nature of the conformity of the tendered goods, see infra notes 172–181 and 
accompanying text.  
 53. See U.C.C. § 1–201(3) (2011).  
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The Convention imposes conditions and limitations on 
buyer’s rights. First, the right to require the delivery of 
substitute goods is only available if the non-conformity is a 
fundamental breach.54 This condition protects the distant seller 
from incurring shipping or transportation costs for insignificant 
defects. Second, the right to require the seller to repair the 
goods only arises if the demand is not unreasonable under the 
circumstances. For example, the right to compel the seller to 
repair the goods may be unavailable if the buyer is able to 
correct the non-conformity.55 A buyer asserting either of these 
remedial rights may receive one of two possible responses from 
the defaulting seller: a concession by the seller to the demand 
followed by performance of the request, or a denial of the seller 
of the obligation to perform. In the latter case, the buyer 
encounters the limitation imposed by Article 28 of the 
Convention, regarding enforcement of a buyer’s right to compel 
performance.56 Although Article 28 recognizes a party’s right to 
require performance, it does not obligate a court to enforce the 
right to substitute performance or the right to request repairs 
unless a court would do so under domestic law. Therefore, the 
buyer must determine if the right to compel the delivery of 
substitute goods or to compel repairs is, indeed, recognized by 
the court that it selects as the forum for enforcing its right. 
Promulgation of the Code has liberalized the availability of 
specific performance in U.S. courts; compelling the seller to 
deliver substitute goods or to make repairs is growing in 
recognition when appropriate circumstances arise, although it 
is not a part of the U.S. domestic legal tradition.57 Additionally, 
 
 54. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court of Poland], May 11, 2007, V 
CSK 456/06, English abstract available at http://www.unilex.info/ 
case.cfm?id=1374 (holding that buyer cannot demand substitute goods from 
buyer unless there was a fundamental breach of the contract). 
 55. UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 39, at 153. 
 56. CISG, supra note 1, art. 28 (“If, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention, one party is entitled to require performance of any obligation 
by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific 
performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of 
similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention.”).  
 57. See Colorado–Ute Elec. Ass’n, v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1152, 
1159 (D. Colo. 1981) (holding specific performance is a proper remedy to 
compel a seller to repair a unique item such as a precipitator that the buyer 
purchased to measure state pollution standards); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of 
U.S., Inc. v. State, 146 A.D.2d 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) aff'd, 550 N.E.2d 919 
(N.Y. 1990) (rejecting automobile association’s position that state lemon laws 
granting buyers a remedial right to a replacement vehicle violated its right to 
trial by jury and finding that such a remedy allows for specific performance in 
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Article 28 does not limit a court’s discretion to deviate from 
domestic law in order to facilitate uniform interpretation of the 
Convention, or to protect the expectations of foreign parties.58 
The buyer who desires to have an enforceable right to compel 
performance must consider including a choice of forum clause 
in its agreement with the seller and should select a forum 
whose domestic law authorizes specific performance. In 
selecting a forum additional factors should be considered, such 
as foreign procedural rules and the availability of discovery 
tools. Alternatively, the parties might agree to arbitrate their 
potential disputes and expressly agree that specific relief is 
available.  
The right to cure provisions of the Convention provide 
greater parity between the parties than the Code. The seller 
has expansive rights to correct its defective performance and to 
reduce the damages the buyer may incur, the buyer is not 
subject to the seller’s desire to cure, and the buyer is 
empowered to demand a cure—a meaningful remedy—from the 
seller. Allowing the buyer to demand a cure recognizes the 
costs associated with seeking substitute goods in the open 
market that could potentially be minimized by requiring the 
seller to provide them, since the seller is already engaged in 
producing or acquiring the exact goods the buyer seeks. Put 
another way, if the breaching seller is required to supply 
conforming goods—from its inventory, by immediate 
manufacture, or acquisition from third parties—then the costs 
associated with locating a substitute provider and negotiating a 
substitute contract, the impact on the buyer’s business and 
reputation caused by delay in obtaining substitute goods from a 
third party, and the magnitude of the damages accumulated, 
although recoverable, are reduced. “Substitute goods may be 
difficult to locate . . . their price may be substantially above the 
 
the appropriate contexts); Stoughton Trailers, LLC v. ArcelorMittal Dofasco, 
Inc., 2008 WL 4722398 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 8, 2008) (declining to grant specific 
performance as a remedy when the defective goods were not determined to be 
“unique” and awarding damages was not inadequate); U.C.C. § 2–716(1) 
(2011) (“Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in 
other proper circumstances.”) (emphasis added).  
 58. See Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in 
International Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention, 63 Wash. L. Rev. 607 (1988); see generally John Fitzgerald, CISG, 
Specific Performance, and the Civil Law of Louisiana and Quebec, 16 J. L. & 
COM. 291 (1997); Markus Müller–Chen, Article 28, in COMMENTARY ON THE 
UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS supra note 42, at 
459. 
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contract price; or alternative manufacturers may not have 
comparable reputations for quality;”59 or may fail to provide 
desired warranties. Sellers also benefit from the buyer’s use of 
Article 46(2) and (3). Sellers who perform “preserve good will 
[with customers], reduce damage liability and avoid the drastic 
remedy of avoidance of the contract.”60  
The remedial rights of cure available through the 
Convention give international commercial parties the flexibility 
needed to meet the challenges that they face in rectifying 
defective performance, despite the limitation imposed by 
Article 28. Additionally, remedial rights of cure increase the 
likelihood of resolving the seller’s failure without litigation. In 
comparison to the Code, the Convention provides the better 
remedy for non-conforming or defective goods. 
 
B. BUYER’S OBLIGATION TOWARDS REJECTED GOODS – 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
Despite the existence of the right to cure or the right to 
demand a cure, the non-conforming or defective goods may not 
be curable. For example, even when the seller attempts to 
repair or modify goods, the modified goods may not satisfy the 
seller’s obligation under the contract terms. The quality of the 
goods as repaired may impair the integrity of the buyer’s end 
product, the repaired goods may fail to meet the buyer’s resale 
obligation, or the attempted cure of rejected goods may be 
unsuccessful. In any of these cases, both legal regimes, the 
Code and the Convention, establish a standard of care for a 
buyer who is in control or possession of the goods.61 The Code 
requires a buyer who is pushing the goods back on the seller to 
hold rejected goods in its possession, or within its control, with 
reasonable care62 for the seller’s disposition but only for “a time 
sufficient” for the seller to take custody of the goods.63 This 
 
 59. See Kastely, supra note 58, at 611. 
 60. JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER 
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 416 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 
2009) (discussing the benefits granted to sellers who deliver substitute goods 
or who repair non-conforming goods). 
 61. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 85–88; U.C.C. §§ 2–602, 2–604 (2011). 
 62. U.C.C. § 2–602(2)(b) (2011); see generally In re Empire Pacific 
Industries, Inc., 71 B.R. 500 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987); Yates v. Clifford Motors, 
Inc., 423 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super Ct. 1980) (stating that U.C.C. § 2–602 only 
imposes a duty on the buyer to hold rejected goods for the seller and not a duty 
to return them). 
 63. Graybar Elec. Co. v. Shook, 195 S.E.2d 514 (N.C. 1973) (holding that, 
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duty to hold with reasonable care is subject to the buyer’s right 
to sell the goods to satisfy a security interest granted to the 
buyer under Article 2 of the Code for deposits or other 
payments made for the goods or expenses incurred in 
transporting, inspecting, caring for, or holding the goods for 
seller.64 This right to sell the goods to satisfy the buyer’s outlay 
for the goods protects the buyer from: 1) the risk of non–
reimbursement from an insolvent seller;65 2) the time and 
expense of negotiating a reimbursement;66 and 3) the cost of 
litigation to recover the buyer’s expenses or payments.  
Section 2–603 of the Code imposes a special obligation on 
merchant buyers ,67 buyers with specialized knowledge of the 
 
although goods were ultimately stolen, buyer fulfilled duty to care for goods by 
storing rejected items in a well–lit storage area for three months); Lykins Oil 
Co. v. Fekkos, 507 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio C.P. 1986) (holding that seller was 
responsible for loss of stolen tractor after permitting buyer to leave it on his 
lawn until seller could retrieve it). 
 64. U.C.C. § 2–711(3) (2011) (“On rightful rejection or justifiable 
revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security interest in goods in his 
possession or control for any payments made on their price and any expenses 
reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and 
custody and may hold such goods and resell them in like manner as an 
aggrieved seller.”); see, e.g., T & S Brass & Bronze Works, Inc. v. Pic–Air, Inc., 
790 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that buyer could keep non-
conforming zinc handles because he had acquired a security interest in the 
goods for the cost of inspecting them); Kleiderfabrik v. Peters Sportswear Co., 
483 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (buyer resold non-conforming jackets 
to recover its handling costs, but it failed to provide the seller with notice of 
the sale as required by §2–706 and destroyed records regarding the sale; 
buyer’s actions did not constitute conversion but ambiguities would be 
resolved against the buyer); Johnsrud v. Lind, 219 N.W.2d 181, 191 (N.D. 
1974) (holing that buyer obtained a security interest in the delivered rejected 
steers for the buyer’s partial payment plus any expenses reasonably incurred 
to care for the steers); Askco Engineering Corp. v. Mobil Chemical Corp., 535 
S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that buyer obtained a security 
interest in rejected goods for the inspecting, testing, storing, and attempted 
resale of the goods). 
 65. In re DeNicola, 92 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (concluding that 
buyer lost the right to assert security interest in the rejected electric cart 
when she surrendered possession of it to the seller); In re Adams Plywood, 
Inc., 48 B.R. 719 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1985) (deciding that buyer should have 
retained possession of the rejected goods to protect its right to assert a security 
interest in the goods under U.C.C. §2–711). 
 66. See Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 657 P.2d 109 (N.M. 1982) (buyer 
rejected and held defective pickup truck dump units for two years after seller 
refuse to reimburse shipping costs incurred in taking delivery; the buyer’s 
subsequent sale of the units was not an acceptance of the goods).  
 67. U.C.C. § 2–104 (2011) (“‘Merchant’ means a person who deals in goods 
of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having 
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the 
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goods68 or who have knowledge of the specialized practices of 
the relevant industry.69 The merchant buyer must follow any 
reasonable instructions received from the seller regarding the 
goods and, if none are received, make reasonable efforts to sell 
the goods in its possession or within its control for the seller’s 
account if the tendered goods are perishable or threaten to 
decline speedily in value. Possession and control are “words of 
wide, rather than narrow, import . . . [T]he measure of the 
buyer’s ‘control’ is whether he can practicably effect control 
without undue commercial burden.”70 The determining factor of 
the buyer’s obligation is the extent of the burden on the buyer 
in taking possession of the goods.71 Beyond these special 
obligations imposed on merchant buyers and any contract 
terms that impose additional duties, the buyer has no further 
obligations to the rejected goods.72 The buyer is entitled to 
 
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his 
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation 
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.”).  
 68. U.C.C. § 2–104 cmt. 2 (2011) (“The special provisions as to merchants 
appear only in this Article and they are of three kinds . . . A third group of 
sections includes 2–103(1)(b), which provides that in the case of a merchant 
‘good faith’ includes observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing in the trade; 2–327(1) (c), 2–603 and 2–605, dealing with 
responsibilities of merchant buyers to follow seller’s instructions, etc.; 2–509 
on risk of loss, and 2–609 on adequate assurance of performance. This group of 
sections applies to persons who are merchants under either the ‘practices’ or 
the ‘goods’ aspect of the definition of merchant.”). 
 69. See K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1115 (6th 
Cir. 1982) (holding that two sewer contractors were merchants because of 
their knowledge of the sewage industry even though neither had specialized 
knowledge of the goods); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant 
Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in 
Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141 (1985); R.J. Robertson, Jr., Rights and 
Obligations of Buyers with Respect to Goods in Their Possession After Rightful 
Rejection or Justifiable Revocation of Acceptance, 60 IND. L.J. 663, 675–676 
(1985) (explaining that knowledge of specialized practices is the reasonable 
understanding of who U.C.C. merchant provisions apply to). 
 70. U.C.C. § 2–603 cmt. 2 (2011). See e.g., Mitral Corp. v. Vermont Knives, 
Inc., 566 A.2d 406 (Vt. 1989) (holding that buyer had duty to follow seller’s 
reasonable instructions regarding care of rejected goods). 
 71. See U.C.C. § 2–603 cmt. 2 (2011). 
 72. U.C.C. § 2–602(2)(c) (2011); see also T & S Brass & Bronze Works, Inc. 
v. Pic–Air, Inc., 790 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that buyer’s 
refusal to follow seller’s instructions to return defective handles did not 
constitute acceptance because the seller refused to pay the expenses of 
returning the goods, making its instructions unreasonable); Delano Growers' 
Co–op. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 473 N.E.2d 1066, 1073 (Mass. 1985) 
(holding that buyer fulfilled its obligation after following seller’s instructions 
to process and resell the goods); Integrated Circuits Unlimited, Inc. v. E.F. 
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acquire substitute goods and seek damages to compensate it for 
the resulting loss even if substitute goods are not acquired.73 
 
1. Buyer’s Obligation to Preserve Rejected Goods – The 
Convention 
Although similar to the obligations imposed by the Code, 
those imposed by the Convention are not identical. If the buyer 
receives the goods and intends to reject them pursuant to a 
right provided in the Convention or a contractual right, the 
buyer must take reasonable steps under the circumstances to 
preserve the rejected goods.74 The Convention does not define 
“rejection” but includes the right to refuse the goods after they 
have been delivered. Under the Convention, the buyer has the 
right to refuse seller’s goods after delivery if any one of the 
following five situations occurs: 1) a fundamental breach by the 
seller giving the buyer the right to avoid the contract;75 2) the 
buyer requests the delivery of substitute goods because of the 
seller’s fundamental breach;76 3) the seller delivers early and 
the buyer refuses to take delivery;77 4) the seller delivers a 
quantity in excess of that ordered and the buyer refuses the 
delivery;78 and 5) the buyer exercises the right to suspend 
performance after the seller dispatches the goods and the seller 
fails to provide adequate assurances of its performance.79 Only 
 
Johnson Co., 691 F. Supp. 630, 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 
875 F.2d 1040 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a buyer of microprocessors who 
received no instructions from the seller, whose goods were neither perishable 
nor subject to rapidly declining value, was not required to resell the goods); 
Robertson, Jr., supra note 69, at 673–673 (discussing inconsistent holdings 
regarding the effect of buyer’s conduct after rejection or revocation of 
acceptance).  
 73. U.C.C. §§ 2–712, 2–713 (2011). 
 74. CISG, supra note 1, art. 86.  
 75. See HONNOLD, supra note 60, at 454–57 (explaining the circumstances 
when a buyer can reject non–conforming parts of a delivery and when a buyer 
can avoid the contract completely). 
 76. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2).  
 77. See id. art. 52(1); Klaus Bacher, Articles 85–88, in COMMENTARY ON 
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 895, 903 (Peter 
Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
 78. Bacher, supra note 77, at 903; see CISG supra note 1, art. 52(2).  
 79. CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(1); see, e.g., Oberlandesgericht Hamm 
[OLG] [higher regional court] June 23, 1998, 19 U 127/97 (Ger.), English 
abstract available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980623g1.html (“The 
buyer was allowed to suspend performance of its obligations according to 
article 71(1)(a) CISG. . . . [I]t had become apparent that the sellers would not 
be able to perform the delivery of the furniture, which constituted a 
substantial part of their obligations.”); Landgericht Berlin [LG] [regional 
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in these circumstances will the buyer have received the goods 
or will have had the goods placed at the buyer’s disposal. Some 
commentators suggest that this duty to preserve the goods also 
arises if the buyer exercises the right of avoidance when 
authorized by Article 72.80 However, Article 72 recognizes a 
right of avoidance when circumstances, prior to performance, 
clearly indicate that one party will commit a fundamental 
breach; this is the more analogous to anticipatory repudiation 
in UCC § 2–610.81 Conceptually, the authors fail to recognize 
the limited scope of the right of rejection. A right to reject may 
be exercised only if the goods have been received or placed at 
the buyer’s disposal at the contract destination.82 This is the 
condition precedent to the duty to preserve. Article 72 
empowers the buyer to resort to the remedial relief of avoiding 
the contract because of conduct or statements by the seller that 
occur prior to the date of performance.83 A buyer will not have 
goods to reject when it exercises the right of avoidance prior to 
delivery based on conduct or communications indicating that 
the seller will not perform in the future. There is, however, one 
exception: an installment contract.84 For example, assume that 
a buyer and a seller have entered into an installment contract 
with four planned deliveries. Each of the four deliveries is a 
component of new machinery for the buyer’s new 
manufacturing plant. The buyer receives deliveries one and 
two, and then the seller disavows its obligation to meet certain 
standards or the duty to complete performance. These 
 
court] Sept. 15, 1994, 52 S 247/94 (Ger.), English abstract available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940915g1.html (holding that the buyer could 
suspend contract performance under Art. 71(1)(b) CISG because the seller 
failed to assure the buyer of performance after delivering defective items.). 
 80. CISG, supra note 1, art 72. See, e.g., FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH 
MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 355 (1992). 
 81. CISG, supra note 1, art 72; U.C.C. § 2–610 (2011); ENDERLEIN & 
MASKOW, supra note 80, at 291.  
 82. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 83. CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(1); see, e.g., Magellan Int’l Corp. v. 
Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919, 925–926 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (finding 
that if the seller had indicated in a letter “its pre–performance intention not to 
perform the contract” and had insisted upon an amendment to the bill of 
lading, then buyer has standing for anticipatory fundamental breach of 
contract.); Zürich Handelskammer [Zurich Chamber of Commerce] May 31, 
1996, ZHK 273/95 (Switz.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=396 (declaring an unwillingness to make 
further deliveries constitutes a fundamental breach, the buyer was within 
their rights to refuse to pay the bill and try to renegotiate the contract.).  
 84. The Convention refers to “instalment contracts.”  
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statements trigger the buyer’s right to avoid deliveries three 
and four pursuant to Article 72 and to avoid the earlier 
deliveries, one and two, as provided in Article 73(3) because of 
their interdependence.85 In this scenario the buyer has received 
goods and may reject those goods already received along with 
the future deliveries.  
A buyer who receives the goods must take reasonable steps 
under the circumstances to preserve the goods.86 If the seller 
does not have a representative at the destination the same duty 
to protect applies to the goods that have been “placed at [the 
buyer’s] disposal”87 at the agreed destination88 but only if 
possession of the goods can be obtained without paying the 
price and without unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable 
expense.89 Some argue that if possession can be obtained 
 
 85. CISG, supra note 1, art. 73(3) (“A buyer who declares the contract 
avoided in respect of any delivery may, at the same time, declare it avoided in 
respect of deliveries already made or of future deliveries if, by reason of their 
interdependence, those deliveries could not be used for the purpose 
contemplated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract.”). 
See, e.g., China Int’l Econ. & Trade Arb. Comm’n [CIETAC] Apr. 7, 2005, Shen 
G2004100 (China), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050407c1.html (finding that upon taking 
delivery of the goods and finding the goods defective, the buyer’s avoidance of 
the contract for deliveries already made was acceptable under CISG art. 73); 
Neth. Arb. Inst. [NAI] Oct. 15, 2002, 2319 (Neth.), English abstract available 
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021015n1.html (finding that the buyer 
could suspend future deliveries under CISG Article 73(1), because the non-
conformities found in the oil and the deliveries, which were in instalments, 
were not interdependent.); Tribunal Cantonal de Vaud [appellate court] Apr. 
11, 2002, 100/2002 (Switz.), English abstract available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020411s1.html (finding that under CISG art. 
73, even if apparel items formed an “ensemble” with the defective pieces, the 
buyer would still be able to sell those items separately, and therefore; would 
not be required to return all the goods on the grounds of interdependency). 
 86. CISG, supra note 1, art. 86(1). 
 87. Id. art. 86(2). 
 88. See generally, Audiencia Provincial de Navarra [A.P.] [provincial 
appellate court] Jan. 22, 2003, 3/2003 (Spain), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=882; Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona 
[A.P.] [provincial appellate court] Mar. 11, 2002, 60/2002 (Spain), English 
abstract available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020311s4.html; Rizhao 
Intermediate People’s Ct., Dec. 17, 1998, Ri Jingchuzi No.29 (China), English 
abstract available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991217c1.html; Trib. of 
Int’l Commercial Arb. at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce, Sept. 
25, 1995, 142/94 (Russ.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=251. 
 89. See, Secretariat Commentary on Article 75 of the 1978 Draft, GUIDE TO 
CISG ARTICLE 86, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm–86.html. 
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without unreasonable expense, then the rationale used in 
Article 86, which places the duty to protect on the party in the 
best position to protect and care for the goods, justifies the 
application of the duty to protect even if the goods are delivered 
to a destination other than that specified in the agreement.90 
The term “placed at his disposal” is used in Articles 69 and 
86 of the Convention, but the term is not defined.91 Commercial 
parties in international trade are accustomed to this usage 
because of the term’s significance in the shipping and 
delivering of goods. The phrase, “placed at his disposal,” is used 
in a number of the Incoterms, customary shipping terms 
promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce,92 and 
it is employed by parties in international sales agreements to 
identify the point at which the seller has completed its 
performance obligation in delivering the goods.93 “EXW” 
(named place of delivery)94 and “DAP” (named place of 
destination)95 are two examples. The seller completes its 
 
 90. See Bacher, supra note 77, at 904 (arguing that if the buyer can take 
possession of the goods without any problems, Article 86(2) may be applied by 
analogy to goods dispatched to a place other than their contractually agreed 
destination).  
 91. CISG, supra note 1, art. 69 (“(1) In cases not within articles 67 and 68, 
the risk passes to the buyer when he takes over the goods or, if he does not do 
so in due time, from the time when the goods are placed at his disposal and he 
commits a breach of contract by failing to take delivery. (2) However, if the 
buyer is bound to take over the goods at a place other than a place of business 
of the seller, the risk passes when deliver is due and the buyer is aware of the 
fact that the goods are placed at his disposal at that place. (3) If the contract 
relates to goods not then identified, the goods are considered not to be placed 
at the disposal of the buyer until they are clearly identified to the contract.”) 
(emphasis added); CISG, supra note 1, art. 86(2) (“If goods dispatched to the 
buyer have been placed at his disposal at their destination and he exercises 
the right to reject them, he must take possession of them on behalf of the 
seller, provided that this can be done without payment of the price and 
without unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense.”) (emphasis 
added).  
 92. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 2010, 16, 54, 62, 70 
(2010) for Incoterms that use the phrase “placing them at the disposal of the 
buyer.”  
 93. See generally id. at 5–11 for rules on the use of domestic and 
international trade terms. 
 94. See id. ¶ A4, at 16 (“The seller must deliver the goods by placing them 
at the disposal of the buyer at the agreed point, if any, at the named place of 
delivery, not loaded on any collecting vehicle.”).  
 95. See id. at 61 (“[T]he seller delivers when the goods are placed at the 
disposal of the buyer on the arriving means of transport ready for unloading at 
the named place of destination. The seller bears all risks involved in bringing 
the goods to the named place.”).  
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performance obligation to deliver the goods EXW (1464 
Washington St., Phoenix, Arizona [seller’s place of business]) 
when the goods are placed at the agreed point, seller’s place of 
business, for the buyer96 and buyer has been given notice.97 
Similarly, DAP (named place of destination) imposes on the 
seller the duty to provide the contract goods on the arriving 
means of transport ready for unloading at the named place of 
destination.98 Notice must also be given so that the buyer may 
take delivery of the goods.99  
In the Code the phrase “put and hold” is the delineation of 
the seller’s duty of tender of delivery.100 It is analogous to the 
term “placed at his disposal” used in the Convention. “[T]he 
seller [must] put and hold conforming goods at the buyer’s 
disposition and give the buyer any notification reasonably 
necessary to enable him to take delivery.”101 When the seller 
has completed its obligation of performance, at the agreed 
place, in the manner required by the agreed to shipping terms, 
and provided the buyer with notice, then the goods are “placed 
at [the buyer’s] disposition.”102 
 
a.  Preserving the Goods: The Rights and Obligations 
These rights and obligations can be best illustrated through a 
hypothetical example. Assume that a Georgian winery agrees 
to sell one hundred cases of its finest wine “FAS (free alongside 
ship) Port Said (Incoterms)”103 to a U.S. importer. Under this 
shipping term, the goods are delivered when placed alongside 
 
 96. Id. para. A4, at 16. 
 97. Id. para. A7, at 18. 
 98. Id. para. A4, at 62. 
 99. Id. para. A7, at 64. 
 100. U.C.C. § 2–503 (2011). (“Tender of delivery requires that the seller put 
and hold conforming goods at the buyer’s disposition and give the buyer any 
notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery. The manner, 
time and place for tender are determined by the agreement and this Article, 
and in particular (a) tender must be at a reasonable hour, and if it is of goods 
they must be kept available for the period reasonably necessary to enable the 
buyer to take possession but (b) unless otherwise agreed the buyer must 
furnish facilities reasonably suited to the receipt of the goods.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 101. Id. § 2–503(1) (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. 
 103. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 92, at 79 (“[Delivering 
occurs] when the goods are placed alongside the vessel . . . The risk of loss of or 
damage to the goods passes when the goods are alongside the ship, and the 
buyer bears all costs from that moment onwards.”).  
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the ship designated by the buyer at Port Said in Egypt.104 
Assume further that the winery does not have an office, agent, 
or representative of its interest in Egypt. However, the buyer 
engaged a third party to inspect the goods before they 
commenced the final leg of their journey to the U.S. Based on 
the condition and temperature of the bottles the inspector 
concludes that a fundamental breach has occurred, and he 
advises the importer to reject the shipment. Because the goods 
arrived, were placed at the buyer’s disposal at the contract 
destination, and the buyer rejected them, the buyer must take 
possession only if the buyer can accomplish possession without 
paying for the goods or without unreasonable inconvenience or 
unreasonable expense.105 “FAS” does not impose a payment 
obligation, unlike the shipping term “CIF (Incoterms),” that 
imposes an obligation on the buyer to pay for the goods upon 
presentment of the contractually required documents before the 
arrival and inspection of the goods.106 No duty to take 
possession or to preserve the goods arises from a “CIF Port Said 
(Incoterms)” shipping term, because the shipping term requires 
payment for the goods before possession can be acquired.107 
With the FAS shipment term, if the goods have been placed at 
the buyer’s disposal, the U.S. importer must take possession of 
the goods and preserve them consistent with the obligations 
imposed by Article 86(2).108  
In this example the U.S. importer may store the wine at 
the seller’s expense with a third party,109 or retain the wine 
until it is reimbursed its reasonable expenses for preserving 
 
 104. For additional obligations imposed upon the seller under FAS, see Id. 
¶ A2, at 80, ¶ A7, at 82.  
 105. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 86. 
 106. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 92, at 105 (“Cost Insurance 
and Freight.”). 
 107. See Secretariat Commentary on Article 75 of the 1978 Draft, supra 
note 89; see also INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 92, ¶ A8, at 114 
(“The seller must, at its own expense provide the buyer without delay the 
usual transport document for the agreed port of destination.”); Id. ¶ B8, at 115 
(“The buyer must accept the transport document provided as envisaged in A8 
if it is in conformity with the contract.”).  
 108. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 86(2). 
 109. See id. art. 87; see, e.g., Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, supra note 
88 (recognizing that CISG art. 87 permits a party with the duty to preserve 
the goods to deposit the goods at the other party’s expense as long as the cost 
is not unreasonable); Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 1994 WL 495787 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1994) (finding the buyer is entitled to recover costs of 
handling and storing non-conforming compressors) aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995).  
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the wine.110 Observe that unlike the buyer subject to the Code 
who is permitted to sell the goods to recover on its security 
interest in the goods to the extent of its expenses and 
payments, the buyer subject to the Convention may only retain 
the goods as security for its expenses. Although, Article 86(2) 
creates an exception to the duty to preserve the goods if doing 
so involves an unreasonable expense,111 Article 88 mandates 
the sale of goods that rapidly deteriorate or if their 
preservation “involves unreasonable expense.”112 Our importer 
must determine if the condition of the goods will rapidly 
deteriorate, especially given their condition at delivery, and, if 
so, resell to eliminate the likelihood of being allocated the loss 
resulting from their continuing deterioration. Consequently, 
the importer who is excused from preserving the goods if doing 
so involves unreasonable expense will have a duty to sell the 
goods if they are perishable and subject to rapid deterioration. 
Unlike the Code, the Convention does not extend this duty to 
avoid loss in value of the goods because of shifts in the 
market.113 
This obligation was a rude awakening for a buyer who 
purchased shrimp from a breaching Chinese seller. The buyer’s 
end–user in Mexico took delivery of non-conforming shrimp 
from a Chinese seller.114 The buyer retained the non-
conforming shrimp in storage pending the resolution of the 
dispute with the seller, without reselling the perishable goods 
and as a result the buyer sustained a tremendous loss.115 The 
tribunal found that the buyer permitted the losses to grow until 
 
 110. CISG, supra note 1, art. 85. 
 111. See id. art. 86(2). 
 112. See id. art. 88.  
 113. U.C.C. § 2–603(1) (“Subject to any security interest in the buyer 
(subsection (3) of Section 2–711), when the seller has no agent or place of 
business at the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty after 
rejection of goods in his possession or control to follow any reasonable 
instruction received from the seller with respect to the goods and in the 
absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell them for the 
seller’s account if they are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 114. Rizhao Intermediate People’s Ct., Dec. 17, 1998, Ri Jingchuzi No.29 
(China), English abstract available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991217c1.html (holding that because the 
buyer did not take reasonable measures to preserve the shrimp pending 
litigation, permitting losses to grow, the buyer was not entitled to a full 
recovery from the sellers for the loss in value between delivery and resale by 
customs.).  
 115. Id.  
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the value of the shrimp was “nearly extinguished.”116 The court 
determined that the sellers must repay the buyer $110,701.86 
for the non-conforming shrimp ($103,562.86 price of the goods, 
$1,052 DDC fee,117 $5,752 freight, $300 supervision of loading, 
and $35 certification fee118) plus interest starting from May 3, 
1996, the date the buyer’s demand for negotiations expired,119 
until the actual date of repayment.120 This recovery was subject 
to a set–off of 70% of the loss in value of the stored shrimp, or 
$56,941.21, which reduced the buyer’s total recovery by 
54.98%.121 
 
2. The Seller’s Duty to Preserve the Goods – The 
Convention 
Other than the seller’s common law duty to mitigate its 
damages that supplements the Code,122 the Article 85 
 
 116. Id.  
 117. “DDC” is the destination delivery charge that “covers crane lifts off the 
vessel, drayage of the container within the terminal and gate fees at the 
terminal operation.” AIR 7 SEAS TRANSPORT LOGISTICS, INC., 
http://www.air7seas.com/ddc.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).  
 118. Interview with Kirina Alonzo, Sales Representative, Air 7 Seas 
Transport Logistics, Inc., (suggesting that the $35 certification fee is likely to 
have been a Shipper Export Declaration fee, a declaration that the value of the 
shipment exceeded $2500).  
 119. Rizhao Intermediate People’s Ct., Ri Jingchuzi No.29 (China) (The 
buyer delivered the notarized documents of the FDA’s shut out of the shrimp 
on April 25, 1996, and gave the sellers seven days to negotiate. The court 
calculated the commencement of interest date for the following day, May 3, 
1996).  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.; cf. China Int’l Arb. Comm. [CIETAC] 
[PRC–Shenzhen], June 6, 1991, English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910606c1.html (imposing storage fees on the 
buyer and denying the buyer’s claim for the vast majority of the purchase 
price when a Mexican buyer of Cysteine Monohydrate failed to take 
reasonable measures to preserve the good and disregarded the Chinese seller’s 
instructions for returning the non-conforming goods, which subsequently 
decompose, the seller was only required to compensate the buyer $3,000)  
 122. See K & D Distribs., Ltd. V. Aston Grp., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 761, 768 
(N.D. Ohio 2005); Simeone v. First Bank Nat. Ass’n, 73 F.3d 184, 188–89 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (“[A]n aggrieved party has a duty to mitigate damages.”); Schiavi 
Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 724–25 (Me. 1983) (“The 
common law duty to mitigate damages survives Maine’s enactment of the 
Uniform Commercial Code in 1963. While the U.C.C. does not explicitly 
require the mitigation of damages, it does provide that ‘principles of law and 
equity’ not displaced shall supplement the Code’s provisions. 11 M.R.S.A. § 1–
103 (1964). The duty to mitigate is also implicit in the Code’s broad 
requirements of good faith, commercial reasonableness and fair dealing.”); see 
also U.C.C. § 1–103 (2011).  
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imposition of the seller’s duty to preserve the goods is without 
direct parallel in the Code. Indeed, in this regard the structure 
of the Code and its remedial preferences are the diametrical 
opposite of the Convention. A seller, subject to the Code, who is 
confronted with a buyer’s breach for goods identified to the 
contract, is expected to resell the goods rather than to hold 
them for the buyer. Although Section 2–709 imposes an 
analogous duty of holding goods for the buyer, this duty only 
arises if the seller seeks to sue for the price of the goods after 
“the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a 
reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that 
such effort will be unavailing.”123 In contrast, the seller who is 
subject to the Convention must hold the goods for the buyer 
until the seller avoids, or cancels, the contract. The Code’s 
remedial structure encourages the seller to act with immediacy 
in considering other potential customers or uses for the goods. 
The seller who is subject to the Convention may lack the 
corresponding incentive to act as expeditiously. The Code’s 
approach is less likely to result in waste by forcing undesired 
goods on a reluctant buyer. However, a thorough assessment of 
the Convention’s approach is warranted. 
If taking delivery or making payment is a concurrent 
condition of the seller’s obligation to deliver, and the buyer fails 
to take delivery or to pay, the seller’s duty to preserve the goods 
for the buyer is triggered. This obligation, with a right of 
reimbursement, only arises if the seller has possession of the 
goods or the seller is able to take control of them. The duty will 
not arise for a seller who has surrendered the goods to a 
carrier, putting the goods beyond the seller’s control. However, 
releasing possession of goods to a carrier upon the delivery of a 
nonnegotiable bill of lading does not place them beyond the 
control of the seller.124 The Convention imposes this duty to 
preserve on the seller despite the earlier shifting of the risk of 
loss to the buyer. The party with the risk of loss is accountable 
for the goods if the goods suffer casualty or are lost or 
destroyed.125 The seller’s obligation of preservation parallels 
that of the buyer and reflects the policy goal of placing the 
responsibility for the goods on the party in the best position to 
 
 123. U.C.C. § 2–709(1)(b) (2011); see also id. § 2–709(2).  
 124. See, e.g., id. § 7–504(c), (d). 
 125. For an argument on how to allocate the risk of loss, see HONNOLD, 
supra 60, at 508. 
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protect and care for the goods so that loss is minimized.126 
When the seller’s contractual obligation requires the seller to 
place goods at the buyer’s disposal at the seller’s place of 
business; or to deliver the goods to the buyer’s facility; or to use 
the seller’s trucks for delivery, the shifting of the risk of loss is 
governed by Article 69.127 The risk of loss shifts to the buyer 
when the buyer takes possession or fails to take possession 
when the goods are placed at its disposal. If the goods are lost 
or destroyed the buyer remains obliged to pay the contract 
price for the goods. The breaching buyer who fails to take 
delivery has the risk of loss and the seller who has possession 
or control over the goods has the duty to preserve them or to 
sell them for the buyer’s account, if they are rapidly 
deteriorating.128  
In a transaction subject to the Code, the similarly situated 
seller has an index of remedies that is triggered when the 
buyer repudiates its duty of performance, wrongfully rejects 
goods, wrongfully revokes its acceptance of the goods, or 
otherwise breaches its obligation. This index includes the right 
to resell the goods. However, the seller is not accountable to the 
buyer for any profit made on the resale of the wrongfully 
rejected goods,129 and the resale transaction may be used to 
measure the seller’s damages, if it was conducted in good 
faith.130 Resale is the seller’s sale for the seller’s benefit. This 
 
 126. Bacher, supra note 77, at 904; HONNOLD, supra note 60, at 677.  
 127. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 69 (“(1)In cases not with articles 67 and 
68, the risk passes to the buyer when he takes over the goods or, if he does not 
do so in due time, from the time when the goods are placed at his disposal and 
he commits a breach of contract by failing to take delivery. (2) However, if the 
buyer is bound to take over the goods at a place other than a place of business 
of the seller, the risk passes when delivery is due and the buyer is aware of the 
fact that the goods are placed at his disposal at that place.”).  
 128. See generally, Bacher, supra note 77, at 912.  
 129. U.C.C. § 2–706 cmt. 11 (2011) (“[T]he seller retains profit, if any, 
without distinction based on whether or not he had a lien since this Article 
divorces the question of passage of title to the buyer from the seller's right of 
resale or the consequences of its exercise.”); see, e.g., Desbien v. Penokee 
Farmers Union Co–op. Ass’n, 552 P.2d 917, 927 (Kan. 1976) (finding that the 
buyers breach of contract allowed the buyers to retain profits gained from 
selling their grain at market price, nearly double that of the original contract 
price); Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900, 908–909 (N.D. 1975) 
(finding a breach of contract when the buyer refused the grain, allowing the 
seller to resell the grain at a higher price and retain the profits). 
 130. U.C.C. § 2–706(1) (2011); see, e.g., Eades Commodities, Co. v. Hoeper, 
825 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (“[T]he seller who resells goods has 
damages based upon the difference between the contract price and 
the resale price.”) (emphasis in original); President Container, Inc. v. Patimco, 
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distinction between the Convention’s obligation of preservation 
and the Code’s resale remedy is rooted in the right of the seller, 
whose contract is subject to the Convention, to require the 
buyer to pay for and to take the goods.131 This right is an 
absolute, remedial alternative that is available until the seller 
exercises the right to avoid or cancel the contract.132 This right 
to require payment for the goods is not conditioned upon 
seller’s inability to resell the goods as required by Code section 
2–709(b).133 Rather, the Code reflects a preference for the 
seller’s resale of the goods as a seller’s preferred remedial tool 
with compensation for incidental damages for transportation, 
storage and insurance costs.134 After the buyer’s breach the 
goods are in the seller’s hands. The seller is the party with the 
better knowledge of the goods, their use, and the relevant 
markets.135 This preference for a resale for the seller’s account 
minimizes loss by forcing the sale or use of the goods on the 
party best able to promote them. A seller whose contract is 
subject to the Code may only require the buyer to take and pay 
for the goods if their resale is unavailable after reasonable 
effort 136 or circumstances, such as the custom nature of the 
 
82 A.D.2d 879 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (holding that the seller’s failure to 
establish market price was not fatal to their recovery under U.C.C. § 2–706); 
see generally Roy Ryden Anderson, A Roadmap for Sellers’ Damage Remedies 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Some Thought about Pleading and 
Proving Special Damages, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 245, 255–60 (1988) (discussing the 
complexities of the damage formulae provided for in U.C.C. § 2–706 and § 2–
708 when sellers resell the goods in “good faith” and in a “commercially 
reasonable manner”). 
 131. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 62.  
 132. HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 453 at 608.  
 133. Id. 
 134. U.C.C. § 2–710 (2011) (“Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller 
include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions 
incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods 
after the buyer’s breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or 
otherwise resulting from the breach.”). 
 135. See Anderson, supra note 130, at 253, for a critique of § 2–709 “risk of 
loss” provisions, as well as the efficiency benefits associated with seller’s 
disposition of the goods.  
 136. U.C.C. § 2–709(1)(b) (2011). Compare Data Documents Inc. v. 
Pottawattamie Cnty., 604 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Iowa 2000) (“[P]laintiff's attempt 
to sell its overstock did not constitute a reasonable effort.”), and In re 
Narragansett Clothing Co., 138 B.R. 354, 365 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992) (finding 
that a seller who only made minimal efforts to contact other buyers, failed to 
make reasonable efforts to resell), with W.I. Snyder Corp. v. Caracciolo, 541 
A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“There was sufficient evidence from which 
the jury could conclude that Appellee was unable to resell the goods at a 
reasonable price after making a reasonable effort to do so.”). See generally 
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goods, indicate that the efforts in reselling the goods would be 
unsuccessful.137 The seller subject to the Code has an incentive 
to move the goods as quickly as possible. As a result, buyers are 
more likely to prefer the Code’s remedial scheme and sellers 
are more likely to be drawn to the Convention. A seller 
operating at capacity will prefer to sell goods from its inventory 
to other parties, minimize its proof obligation to establish 
damages, and require the defaulting buyer to perform. 
 
II. GOODS ORIENTED REMEDIES OF THE CODE – ONE 
LOT DELIVERIES, NON-INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS 
 In a contract that requires the delivery of the goods in one 
lot but the circumstances necessitate the delivery in 
installments,138 the seller has a duty to deliver goods that 
conform to the contract for sale.139 This is commonly known as 
the perfect tender rule.140 The goods must conform to the terms 
of the contract for sale which includes terms implied from 
course of dealings, trade usage, or course of performance.141 
Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer has a right to inspect the 
goods upon identification, tender, or delivery before it pays for 
or accepts the goods.142 If the goods or the tender of delivery 
fails in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may 
reject the whole, accept the whole, or accept any commercial 
 
Anderson, supra note 130, at 253 (“The problem cases under section 2–709 are 
those in which the seller seeks the price action solely on the basis that he 
cannot readily resell the goods at a reasonable price . . . The theory aims to 
avoid economic waste by preventing a seller who is in the business of selling 
the goods, and who thus can more readily and efficiently dispose of them, from 
forcing the goods on a buyer who has no use for them.”).  
 137. U.C.C. § 2–709(1)(b) (2011); see, e.g., Emanuel Law Outlines, Inc. v. 
Multi–State Legal Studies, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1081, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(finding that there was no realistic possibility of selling the outlines so the 
buyer, Multi–State, is responsible for damages); Plateq Corp. of North Haven 
v. Machlett Labs., Inc., 456 A.2d 786, 791(Conn. 1983).  
 138. U.C.C. § 2–307 (2011) (“Unless otherwise agreed all goods called for by 
a contract for sale must be tendered in a single delivery and payment is due 
only on such tender but where the circumstances give either party the right to 
make or demand delivery in lots the price if it can be apportioned may be 
demanded for each lot.”).  
 139. Id. § 2–607 (“Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in 
installment contracts (Section 2–612) and unless otherwise agreed under the 
sections on contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2–718 and 2–719), if 
the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the 
contract . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 140. Id. § 2–601; see also supra note 138 and accompanying text.  
 141. U.C.C. § 2–207 (2011). 
 142. Id. § 2–513. 
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unit or units, if the price can be apportioned,143 and reject the 
balance.144 The buyer’s rejection must be effective, within a 
reasonable time after the delivery or the tender of the goods, 
and the buyer must notify145 the seller within a reasonable time 
of the buyer’s rejection of the goods.146 If the rejection is 
ineffective or untimely, then the goods are accepted by the 
buyer,147 and the buyer is liable for the price.148 The buyer’s 
notice should particularize the defect that the buyer seeks to 
rely upon to justify its rejection.149  
If a defect is not particularized and it is one that was 
ascertainable by reasonable inspection, the buyer, whether a 
merchant or not, is precluded from relying on the unstated 
defect to justify rejection or to establish breach if the seller 
could have cured the defect.150 Likewise a merchant buyer may 
not rely on a defect to justify its rejection of the goods if the 
seller requests in a record a full and final written statement of 
all defects on which the buyer proposes to rely.151 If an 
unparticularized defect is the sole basis for rejection and it 
could have been cured, the rejection is wrongful and the buyer 
has breached its duty; the seller has the right to resort to a 
remedy.152 
 
A. CALCULATING “REASONABLE TIME AFTER TENDER OR 
DELIVERY FOR REJECTION” 
When making an effective rejection the first hurdle for the 
buyer is to ensure that the goods are rejected within a 
“reasonable time” after tender or delivery, in order to thrust the 
goods back on the seller.153 Absent contract terms defining the 
period for rejection or limiting the scope of inspection or 
limiting buyer’s remedial right to reject, the determination of a 
 
 143. Id. § 2–601. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. § 1–202 (“A person ‘notifies’ or ‘gives’ notice or notification to 
another person by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform 
the other person in ordinary course, whether or not the other person actually 
comes to know of it.”).  
 146. Id. § 2–602.  
 147. Id. § 2–606(1)(b). 
 148. Id. § 2–607(3). 
 149. See id. § 2–605. 
 150. Id. § 2–605(1)(a).  
 151. Id. § 2–605(1)(b).  
 152. Id. §§ 2–605, 2–703. 
 153. Id. § 2–602. 
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“reasonable time after tender or delivery” is a factual one 
dependent upon the circumstances such as the buyer’s 
sophistication; the buyer’s knowledge of the goods; the 
complexity of the goods; the nature of the defect, whether it 
was patent or latent; the difficulty in discovering the defect; the 
existence of express warranties regarding the quality of the 
goods; the nature of the goods, were they perishable or durable; 
and any course of performance between the parties after the 
sale and before the buyer’s formal rejection.154 The course of 
performance between the parties—such as complaints by the 
buyer, negotiations between the parties, assurances by the 
seller that the problem would be corrected, and the seller’s 
attempted repairs—may enlarge the period constituting a 
reasonable time.155 This treatment of the course of performance 
between the parties reflects the general policy preference of the 
Code to preserve the deal whenever possible.156 In most cases it 
is too late to reject the goods if the buyer uses the goods and 
has knowledge of a patent defect;157 processes the goods with or 
without knowledge of a defect;158 uses the goods for an 
unreasonable period of time without rejecting them;159 or 
makes a substantial change to the goods.160  
 
 154. See supra notes 147–152 and accompanying text.  
 155. See, e.g., Latham & Assocs., Inc. v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 
589 A.2d 337, 342 (Conn. 1991) (finding that the buyer reasonably delayed 
rejecting the goods while the seller attempted to cure the known defects); 
Yates v. Clifford Motors, Inc., 423 A.2d 1262, 1269 (Pa. 1980) (finding that the 
buyer was not untimely in waiting between four and five months to reject a 
truck because Yates was waiting for repairs to be completed by a Clifford 
Motors repairman); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 
325, 330–31 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (holding that buyer, who allowed seller eight 
months to cure defects in a computer, did not fail to reject in a timely manner). 
 156. U.C.C. § 2 605 cmt. 2. (2011). 
 157. IMA North America, Inc. v. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. 67 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d. 1073, 1094 (Ariz. 2009) (finding it too late for a rejection claim 
since the buyer accepted and used the tablet machine for ten months knowing 
that there were defects). 
 158. See, e.g., Borges v. Magic Valley Foods, Inc., 616 P.2d 273, 275–76 
(Idaho 1980) (finding that the buyer knowingly processed the defective 
potatoes consistent with the buyer’s ordinary course of business and therefore 
has no grounds for rejection); A & G Const. Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 
P.2d 1207 (Alaska 1976).  
 159. See, e.g., Barton Brands, Ltd. v. O’Brien & Gere Inc. of North America, 
69 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1000, 1005 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (finding that the plaintiff 
accepted the baghouse and may not reject the baghouse regardless of defects 
because the plaintiff used the baghouse for several months of daily operation 
during which time the plaintiff had ample opportunity to inspect the goods 
and reject them). 
 160. See, e.g., Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg & Beck Div., Borg–Warner 
JENKINS - RejRevAvoid (22 MINN J INTL L 152 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:50 PM 
2013]    REJECTION, REVOCATION, AND AVOIDANCE  181 
 
A buyer’s untimely rejection is ineffective and constitutes 
an acceptance.161 The ease of forcing the goods back on the 
seller that is afforded by the right of rejection is lost after 
acceptance.162 Borges v. Magic Valley Foods, Inc., provides a 
glimpse of the traps that lie in the path between rejection and 
acceptance.163 Prior to the purchase, the buyer in Magic Valley 
Foods examined potatoes that the seller had available for sale 
and discovered a hollow heart defect in the potatoes.164 The 
buyer and the seller agreed that if further inspection showed 
that the defect was of a substantial nature and the potatoes 
were unfit for buyer’s purposes, the contract would be null and 
void.165 After delivery of the potatoes to the buyer’s plant for 
processing, the state inspectors found substantial defects in 
5000 of the 35000 hundredweight of potatoes.166 Here, rejection 
after processing would have been timely because a contract 
term permitted inspection during the stage of processing the 
goods.167 Negotiations occurred between the parties; the seller 
and buyer agreed on a cure.168 When the cure was unsuccessful, 
the buyer flaked the potatoes and sold them at a loss.169 The 
court correctly determined that the buyer’s act was an 
acceptance of the defective goods because the buyer had an 
obligation to give the seller notice of the failed cure and await 
further instructions from the seller.170 Having previously 
 
Corp., 578 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that the buyer may 
not revoke acceptance of processed goods and was deemed to have accepted the 
processed steel), aff’d, 762 F.2d. 1008 (6th Cir. 1985); Atlan Indus., Inc. v. 
O.E.M., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 184, 189–91(W.D. Okla. 1983) (finding that the 
buyer who received non-conforming reground plastic pellets could still reject 
the goods because the non-conformity was not discovered until after the plastic 
had been substantially changed but was restored to pellets by the buyer). 
 161. U.C.C. § 2–606(1)(b) (2011). 
 162. Intervale Steel Corp., 578 F. Supp. at 1087 (“A buyer’s acceptance of 
the goods will most likely make the seller’s ability to cure the non-conformity 
or resell the goods much more difficult.”). 
 163. Borges v. Magic Valley Foods, Inc., 616 P.2d. 273. 
 164. Id. at 274.  
 165. Id. at 274.  
 166. Id. at 274–75.  
 167. Id. at 275 (“It is . . . clear that the 4,838.77 c. w. t. of potatoes, unable 
to make the fresh pack grade, did not conform to the contract and gave Magic 
West the right of rejection.”).  
 168. Id. at 275.  
 169. Id. at 275. 
 170. Id. at 275–76 (“Generally, a buyer is deemed to have accepted 
defective goods when, knowing the defect, he resells the goods without 
notifying the seller.”); see, U.C.C. § 2–606(1)(c) (2011).  
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rejected the goods, the buyer no longer had title to the 
potatoes;171 title vested in the seller when the buyer rejected 
the goods.172 The buyer had an obligation to give the seller 
notice of the failed cure and to await the seller’s instructions.173 
The goods, though perishable in nature, did not require the 
buyer to immediately flake and sell them in order to prevent 
loss; rather the buyer became obligated to pay the contract 
price for the goods, by flaking and selling them rather than 
notifying the seller that the cure had failed.174 This obligation 
to pay was subject to the buyer’s counterclaim for breach of any 
implied warranty or express warranty, but the burden of proof 
on the issue of breach and the existence of any warranty lies 
with the buyer.175 Rejection involves a simple call on the part of 
the buyer, telling the seller to “come and get them!”176  
 
B. THE CODE GRANTS A BUYER A SECOND RIGHT TO THRUST 
THE GOODS BACK ON THE SELLER – REVOCATION OF 
ACCEPTANCE. 
Under the Code, the buyer may revoke its acceptance of a 
lot or commercial unit whose non–conformity substantially 
impairs its value to the buyer.177 Unlike the perfect tender rule, 
which permits good faith rejection of some or all of the goods for 
any insubstantial defect, revocation of acceptance requires a 
substantial impairment based on the buyer’s subjective 
assessment of its needs and goals under the contract. The 
“substantial impairment” standard is analogous to the material 
breach standard of the common law and Restatement (Second) 
of the Law of Contracts.178 Therefore, the substantial 
impairment standard falls between the perfect tender rule of 
the Code for rejection and the fundamental breach standard 
imposed for avoidance by the Convention.179 Revocation of 
 
 171. U.C.C. § 2–401(2), (4) (2011). 
 172. Id. § 2–401(4). 
 173. Id. §§ 2–603, to 2–604 (2011). 
 174. Id. §§ 2-606(1)(c), 2–607(1) (“The buyer must pay at the contract rate 
for any goods accepted.”). 
 175. Id. § 2–607(4) (“The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach 
with respect to the goods accepted.”). 
 176. Id. § 2–602(1) (the buyer may reject in a reasonable time by giving the 
seller seasonable notification of the rejection). 
 177. Id. §2–608(1) (2011). 
 178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 242. 
 179. For a discussion of the fundamental breach standard see infra note 
270 and accompanying text. 
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acceptance is only available in two limited contexts: 1) the 
buyer’s acceptance of the goods must be induced by a 
reasonable assumption that a non–conformity of which the 
buyer is aware will be cured but the cure has not been 
seasonably provided;180 or 2) the buyer accepts the goods 
without discovering the defect either because of the difficulty of 
discovery,181 or because the seller’s assurances induced the 
acceptance without discovery.182 Revocation of acceptance must 
occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers, or 
should have discovered the asserted grounds, and before any 
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not 
caused by the defective condition of the goods.183 For example, 
 
 180. E.g., Koch Supplies, Inc. v. Farm Fresh Meats, Inc., 630 F.2d 282, 286 
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that for the buyer of a smokehouse who accepted 
delivery two to three weeks after discovery of a defect, revocation of 
acceptance six months after receipt of the smokehouse was effective given past 
dealings between the parties and the seller’s continued efforts to repair the 
smokehouse); Plastic Moldings Corp. v. Park Sherman Co., 606 F.2d 117, 122 
(6th Cir. 1979) (noting that an acceptance made on the reasonable assumption 
that the defects could be cured can be lawfully revoked if the cure is not 
forthcoming); Contours, Inc. v. Lee, 874 P.2d 1100, 1106 (Haw. Ct. App.1994) 
(holding that revocation was unavailable for a buyer who accepted furniture in 
an uncompleted condition, with seller’s assurances of completion, because the 
buyer prevented the completion). 
 181. E.g., Atlan Indus., Inc. v. O.E.M., Inc., 555 F.Supp.184, 188 (W.D. 
Okla. 1983) (noting that a buyer may revoke acceptance if the acceptance was 
reasonably induced by the difficulty of discovery); J.F. Daley Int'l, Ltd. v. 
Midwest Container & Indus. Supply Co., 849 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Mo. 1993) 
(finding that latent defects in plastic bottles were not discovered until after 
buyer processed them for its use). 
 182. E.g., Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406, 1418 (D. Vt. 1986) (holding 
that a buyer of a breeding stallion was induced to accept the horse without 
discovery of defects due to seller’s assurances that it would conduct breeding 
soundness tests and that the horse was breeding sound); Hart Honey Co. v. 
Cudworth, 446 N.W.2d 742, 745–46 (N.D. 1989) (finding a seller of honey 
storage equipment who was unavailable for the buyer’s inspection represented 
that equipment containing live beehives and shown to the buyer from a 
distance was of the same type and condition as the equipment being 
purchased by the buyer; the buyer’s acceptance was induced by the difficulty 
in inspecting the equipment and by seller’s assurances). 
 183. E.g. Royal Typewriter Co., a Div. of Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. 
Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding 
that when the buyer attempted to return the goods seventeen months after 
receiving the goods substantial change existed due to the use, improper 
maintenance, and modifications to the goods); Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg & 
Beck Div., Borg–Warner Corp., 578 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Mich. 1984) 
(holding that the buyer could not revoke acceptance because the buyer 
substantially changed the condition of the good by stamping the purchased 
steel into parts); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. 
Supp. 364, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (holding that the buyer’s continued use and 
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cutting fabric into panels184 or pressing or molding aluminum 
sheets into forms for auto parts185 are the kinds of substantial 
changes that bar revocation of acceptance. Unlike the return of 
non-conforming goods that might be resold to another customer 
at a discounted price, returning substantially modified goods to 
the seller thrusts upon the seller goods it may have difficulty 
selling. The seller may lack a ready market for modified goods, 
or lack the knowledge necessary to market the substantially 
changed goods. The buyer who cannot revoke its acceptance 
may, however, use the Code’s damage remedy for accepted 
goods or breach of warranty, provided by Section 2–714.186 A 
buyer who revokes its acceptance has the same rights and 
obligations towards the goods as the buyer who rejects the 
 
depreciation of the purchased machine over a period approaching its life 
expectancy amounts to a clear substantial change in condition); Stridiron v. 
I.C., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (D. Va. 1984) (holding that the use of car for 
six months and 6,833 miles, relying on seller’s assurances of cure, was not a 
substantial change in the condition of the goods so as to defeat revocation of 
acceptance). 
 184. Trinkle v. Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d 255, 257–58 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1980) (holding that there was a substantial change in the condition of the 
goods barring the buyer from revoking acceptance when the buyer discovered 
a defect that was not discoverable until after the buyer cut the fabric into 
roman shades). But cf. Deere & Co. v. Johnson, 271 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 
2001) (noting that simple depreciation alone usually does not constitute a 
substantial change in the condition of the goods); Lackawanna Leather Co. v. 
Martin & Stewart, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1197, 1202–03 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
the buyer’s revocation of acceptance of purchased hides was a question for the 
jury because the evidence showed (1) the defects in the hides could not have 
been discovered without processing (2) that the seller knew from the beginning 
that the buyer would be processing the goods for use in its business and (3) the 
buyer’s processing of the hides after discovery of the defect enhanced their 
value); ARB, Inc. v. E–Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 197–98 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(finding damage naturally flowing from the attempts to make the equipment 
work was neither inconsistent with the seller's ownership nor a substantial 
change within the meaning of § 2–608). 
 185. Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg & Beck Div., Borg–Warner Corp., 578 F. 
Supp. 1081, 1087–88 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff’d, 762 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 186. U.C.C. § 2–714 (2011) (“Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to 
Accepted Goods: (1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification 
(subsection (3) of Section 2–607) he may recover as damages for any non–
conformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from 
the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable. (2) The 
measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and 
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they 
would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances 
show proximate damages of a different amount. (3) In a proper case any 
incidental and consequential damages under the next section may also be 
recovered.”). 
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goods.187 
 
C. THE GOODS ORIENTED REMEDIES OF THE CONVENTION – 
ONE LOT DELIVERIES, NON–INSTALMENT CONTRACTS 
Unlike the Code, which gives the buyer a reasonable time 
to reject the goods after their delivery or tender,188 the 
Convention mandates prompt examination of the goods within 
as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances.189 
Circumstances used for determining the promptness of the 
buyer’s examination include: the method of delivery including 
the “kind” of packaging of the goods,190 the quantity 
delivered,191 the nature of the goods,192 the skill of the buyer’s 
employees,193 the nature of the defect,194 the obviousness of the 
defect,195 the number or deliveries, and the steps that must be 
 
 187. Id. § 2–608(3) (2011). For a discussion of the merchant buyer’s 
obligation to care for the goods, see text and note, supra note 61. 
 188. U.C.C. § 2–602(1) (2011). For a discussion of the right to reject 
pursuant to the Code, see text and notes, supra note 139.  
 189. CISG, supra note 1, art. 38 (1). 
 190. Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken [OLG] [higher regional court] Jan. 13, 
1993, 1 U 69/92 (Ger.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=180; Obergericht Kanton Luzern [OG] 
[appellate court] Jan. 8, 1997, 11 95 123/357 (Switz.), English translation 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970108s1.html. 
 191. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Aug. 27, 1999, 1 Ob 
223/99x (Austria), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990827a3.html.  
 192. Arrondissementsrechtbank Breda [Rb.] [district court] Jan. 16, 2009, 
197586 / KG ZA 08–659 (Neth.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090116n1.html.  
 193. Gerechtshof Arnhem [Hof] [ordinary court of appeals] June 17, 1997 
96/449, English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=317&step=Abstract ; 
Oberlandesgericht München [OLG] [higher regional court] Mar. 11, 1998, 7 U 
4427/97 (Ger.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=299 (“[B]uyer was an expert merchant, 
who usually sold high value clothes, it could have become aware of the lack of 
conformity by spot check examination and could have given notice of lack of 
conformity much earlier.”).  
 194. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 3, 1999, VIII 
ZR 287/98 (Ger.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&id=447&do=case (finding that the 
defect was only discoverable after expert examination); Obergericht Kanton 
Luzern[OG][appellate court] Jan. 8, 1997, 11 95 123/357 (Switz.), English 
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970108s1.html 
(finding that the determination of the time for examination must take into 
account the nature of the goods, the quantity, the kind of wrapping and all 
other relevant circumstances). 
 195. Gerechtshof Arnhem [Hof] [appellate court] Jan. 28, 2010, 87379/ 
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taken to discover the defect.196 The Convention only obligates 
the buyer to discover those defects that a normal examination, 
one consistent with trade custom or the practices between the 
parties, would reveal.197 If the buyer later complains of a 
particular defect that could have been discovered by immediate 
inspection and testing of the goods upon delivery, the buyer has 
no recourse because Article 38 of the Convention imposes a 
duty on the buyer to have examined the goods and to have 
discovered the defect by random inspection.198 This prompt 
inspection of the goods must be followed by notice of the nature 
of the defect within a reasonable time.199 A recent case 
addressed by the Netherlands Appellate Court illustrates the 
general approach to prompt examination and notice within a 
reasonable time under Article 38 of the Convention.200 The 
Spanish seller delivered lemons to a buyer at its place of 
business in the Netherlands.201 The buyer examined the lemons 
and determined they were not of acceptable quality on the day 
of delivery.202 However, the buyer gave the seller notice of the 
non-conformity twelve days after the delivery.203 The court held 
that the buyer’s notice was untimely; the obvious nature of the 
defect and the perishable character of the goods required 
considerably earlier notice.204  
The period for examination commences at the time of 
 
HAZA 07–716 (Neth.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100128n1.html (finding that the obvious 
nature of the defect and the perishable character of the goods required notice 
earlier than twelve days after delivery).  
 196. Landgericht Berlin [LG] [regional court] Mar. 21, 2003, 103 O 213/02 
(Ger.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&id=921&do=case (finding that while 
the defects in the cloth were only detectable when dyed, the buyer should have 
dyed a sample shortly after delivery to test for defects).  
 197. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Aug. 27, 1999, 1 Ob 
223/99x (Austria), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990827a3.html (noting that the lack of 
conformity preserves only the right to claim the sufficiently specified defects 
and that a notification of other defects afterwards is not possible).  
 198. Id.  
 199. CISG, supra note 1, art. 39 (1). 
 200. Gerechtshof Arnhem [Hof] [appellate court] Jan. 28, 2010, 87379/ 
HAZA 07–716 (Neth.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100128n1.html. 
 201. Id. ¶ 4.1.  
 202. Id. ¶ 4.3. 
 203. Id. ¶ 4.3. 
 204. Id. ¶ 4.4.  
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delivery and transfer of the risk of loss;205 industry usages and 
practices may dictate the required manner of examination.206 
Citing Austrian law, the Austrian Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court’s determination that the buyer had the burden of 
proof on the timeliness and sufficiency of its notice.207 It held 
that the purchase of a large quantity of goods requires the use 
of experts in the field to examine the goods.208 This holding is 
contrary to calculating the time for and duration of an 
examination period based on the quantity of the goods or the 
expertise of the buyer’s employees. It does, however, indicate a 
strong preference for an expeditious means of examination.  
The examination of perishables, such as citrus fruit, must 
take place without delay because the goods may be exposed to 
damage or decay during their transport.209 In a contract that 
does not impose on the seller the obligation to hand the goods 
over at a particular place or to a carrier because the parties use 
a delivery term, such as EXW (Incoterms),210 timely 
examination by the buyer may only be possible before it 
commences the transporting of the goods from the seller’s place 
of business or storage facility.211 However, the seller’s delivery 
to a particular place or to a carrier results in the shifting of the 
risk of loss at that designated place such as FAS Port Said 
 
 205. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 67–69. 
 206. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Aug. 27, 1999, 1 Ob 
223/99x (Austria), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990827a3.html. 
 207. Id.; see also CISG, supra note 1, at 295–298; JOHN HONNOLD, 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES, 
¶¶ 177–178, at 330, ¶ 70.1, at 86–92 (4th ed. 1989) (stating that unless 
expressly provided, CISG does not address the allocation of the burden of 
proof). But Cf. Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, Articles 3, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS 61, 72, ¶ 22 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 
2005). (recognizing the reluctance of the Vienna Convention to address 
burdens of proof but opining that the Convention and not domestic law 
implicitly governs the allocation of the burden of proof). 
 208. [OGH] 1 Ob 223/99x (Austria). 
 209. See Gerechtshof Arnhem [Hof] [appellate court] Jan. 28, 2010, 87379/ 
HAZA 07–716 (Neth.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100128n1.html. 
 210. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 92, at 15 (“’Ex Works’ 
means that the seller delivers when it places the goods at the disposal of the 
buyer at the seller’s premises or at another named place.”). 
 211. Gerechtshof Arnhem [Hof] [appellate court] Jan. 28, 2010, 87379/ 
HAZA 07–716 (Neth.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100128n1.html. 
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Egypt,212 or upon delivery to the carrier. The wise buyer should 
examine perishable goods, or engage a third party to examine 
the goods, upon delivery at the designated place, or before 
transport by the carrier.213 Prompt examination by the buyer 
may only be deferred beyond the point of the seller’s delivery if 
all the goods to be delivered by the seller are redirected or re–
dispatched by the buyer while the goods are in transit.214 If the 
buyer receives the goods and then immediately resells a small 
portion, deferral of the examination is inappropriate. Deferral 
is only available if the buyer does not have a real opportunity to 
examine or to have the goods examined.215 
 
1.  The Buyer’s Notice of the Non-conforming Goods 
Article 39 of the Convention imposes on the buyer an 
obligation to give notice specifying the nature of the lack of 
conformity, within a reasonable time after discovery or from 
the time it ought to have been discovered, but no more than two 
years from the date on which the goods were handed over to the 
buyer.216 The buyer loses the right to rely on non-conformity as 
a basis for its claim if notice is untimely. The ease with which 
discovery may be made is a factor for determining whether the 
examination was within “as short a period as practicable” and 
whether the notice of the defect was given within a reasonable 
time.217 The following cases illustrate the promptness required 
by national courts and arbitration tribunals: sterile wrapped 
medical devices packed in boxes required ten days for prompt 
examination and thirty days from delivery for Article 39 notice 
because the defect could be viewed through the packaging;218 
 
 212.  See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text. 
 213. See generally 18 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:19 
(4th ed. 2012) (noting that determination under the UCC of whether the buyer 
should have inspected the goods within a particular time depends upon the 
difficulty of discovering defects in the goods and their perishability, among 
other factors).  
 214. CISG, supra note 1, art. 38(3). 
 215. See id., art. 38(2). 
 216. See id., art. 39. 
 217. See Pretura di Locarno–Campagna [district court] Apr. 27, 1992, 6252 
(Switz.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920427s1.html.  
 218. Obergericht Kanton Luzern [OG] [appellate court] Jan. 8, 1997, 11 95 
123/357 (Switz.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970108s1.html (holding that thirty days of 
notice is appropriate, compared to the short German eight day period and the 
longer Dutch period of several months).  
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trekking shoes delivered to the buyer’s end user in partial 
deliveries required examination of each delivery, and a total of 
14 days for both the examination and the Article 39 notice was 
imposed unless special circumstances are established by the 
buyer, such as the quantity delivered or the defect required 
examination by a professional.219 These holdings illustrate that 
a buyer should negotiate for an agreed–to period for 
examination and notice, given the demands that courts place on 
buyers. Article 6 of the Convention allows buyers and sellers to 
negotiate terms that vary from the Convention.220 
Courts have imposed sampling on buyers that have argued 
that either the packaging or the nature of the goods 
necessitated the delaying of examination until the goods were 
resold to its end–users. Courts were unconvinced by that 
argument in the following types of cases: defects in individually 
wrapped doors were repetitive and easily recognizable, 
therefore, the buyer could have discovered the defects by 
examining samples;221 defects in cloth were only detectable 
once the cloth was dyed, because the buyer should have dyed a 
sample of the cloth shortly after delivery an examination seven 
weeks after delivery was untimely.222 This pattern of cases also 
suggests that if a method of discovery could have been 
employed by the buyer, buyer should have employed that 
method.223  
Defects in prior deliveries may impact the required scope of 
an examination of subsequently delivered goods. For example, 
a buyer ordered goods for delivery to its end user and received 
 
 219. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Aug. 27, 1999, 1 Ob 
223/99x (Austria), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990827a3.html. 
 220. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6 (“The parties may exclude the application of 
this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any 
of its provisions.”); see, e.g., Arrondissementsrechtbank Zwolle [Rb.] [district 
court] Mar. 5, 1997, HA ZA 95–640 (Neth.), English abstract available 
athttp://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=332&step=Keywords 
(holding that as a result of the seller’s standard terms on notice, trade custom, 
nature of the goods (fish) and the buyer’s expertise, buyer’s notice was 
untimely).  
 221. Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken [OLG] [higher regional court] Jan. 13, 
1993, 1 U 69/92 (Ger.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=180. 
 222. Landgericht Berlin [LG] [regional court] Mar. 21, 2003, 103 O 213/02 
(Ger.), English abstract available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&id. 
 223. See, e.g., Obergericht Kanton Luzern [OG] [appellate court] Jan. 8, 
1997, 11 95 123/357 (Switz.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970108s1.html. 
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notice from its end user of defects in the first delivery of forty–
eight pairs of shoes after the buyer had placed a second 
identical order with the same seller. The buyer’s random, 
“sampling,” examination of the second delivery without 
discovering any defects was held an ineffective manner of 
examination. The buyer’s notice of the non-conformity sixteen 
days after the second delivery was untimely.224 The buyer that 
fails to provide timely notice is not, however, without a remedy. 
Article 44 of the Convention permits the buyer that has a 
reasonable excuse for failing to give the required notice to use 
the price reduction remedy,225 or to recover damages, except its 
lost profits.226 In the relatively few cases and arbitration 
awards that have addressed the question of the buyer’s 
purported “excuse” of its untimely notice, and not its untimely 
examination, only in those instances when the buyer’s untimely 
notice was not the result of the buyer’s neglect or 
inattentiveness has relief been granted.227  
 
 
 224. Landgericht Stuttgart [LG] [regional court] Aug. 31, 1989, 3 KfH 0 
97/89 (Ger.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1. 
 225. CISG, supra note 1, art. 50. 
 226. Id. art. 44 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of article 
39 and paragraph (1) of article 43, the buyer may reduce the price in 
accordance with article 50 or claim damages, except for loss of profit, if he has 
a reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required notice.”). 
 227. The parties jointly appointed a third party to inspect and certify the 
quality of coke when the goods were loaded in China, the place of delivery. The 
buyer in good faith relied on the accuracy of the certificate regarding the 
conformity of the goods and did not independently inspect the coke until it 
arrived in Germany. Case No. 9187 of 1999, ICC Int’l Ct. of Arb., English 
translation available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=466 (finding notice 
of non-conformity to the seller was untimely, the Tribunal permitted recovery 
of the cost of storing and reselling the coke, and the loss incurred from 
blending the coke with a higher grade purchased, but not the buyer’s 
anticipated profit). See Camilla Baasch Andersen, Exceptions to the 
Notification Rule – Are They Uniformly Interpreted?, 9 VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L 
COMM. L. & ARB. § 3.4 at 39–42 (2005) (arguing that reasonable excuse is 
directed to the untimeliness of notice rather than the untimeliness of the 
examination). But see Tribunal of Int’l Commercial Arb. at the Russian 
Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Jan. 24, 2000, 54/1999 (Rus.), 
English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000124r1.html (finding the buyer’s inspection 
of the goods in the loading port as required by the contract had been 
economically and technically inadequate; the buyer’s postponement of the 
quality check until the goods arrived at the port of destination was, therefore, 
considered reasonable by the tribunal and the buyer was entitle to a price 
reduction). 
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2. Technical Requirements for Notice and the Seller’s 
Waiver of the Defense of Untimely Notice 
Article 39 of the Convention does not specify the form or 
method for giving the required notice. Although it ruled that 
written notice was required, the Serbian Chamber of 
Commerce Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration found, consistent 
with the terms of Article 13 of the Convention,228 that the 
writing requirement was satisfied by an electronic 
transmission, which is this case was a fax.229 Courts have held 
notice by telephone to be permissible.230 The buyer’s obligation 
of satisfying the burden of proof may become a challenge if the 
seller asserts that the call was not received or disputes the 
asserted contents of the conversation. The German 
Bundesgerichtshof ruled that a buyer implicitly declared the 
contract avoided by giving notice that it could not make use of a 
certain quantity of the goods and by placing those goods at the 
seller’s disposal.231 If the contract can be avoided by conduct, 
Article 39 notice could likewise arise from implication. The 
weakness in this argument is that only notice that specifies the 
nature of the lack of conformity satisfies the notice 
requirement.232 Consequently, notice by conduct is likely to be 
insufficient. 
Several courts have held that conduct by a seller can 
constitute a waiver of the right to raise an untimely notice of 
the lack of conformity defense. A German seller who declared 
that it would be liable for present or future justified complaints 
regarding the conformity of the goods waived the defense of 
untimely notice.233 Likewise, an Austrian seller that made 
 
 228. CISG, supra note 1, art. 13 (“For the purposes of this Convention 
‘writing’ includes telegram and telex.”). 
 229. Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration [attached to the Serbian Chamber 
of Commerce] Nov. 06, 2005, T–10/04 (Serb.), English translation available at 
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051106sb.html (noting that because the time of the 
transmission couldn’t be verified by the buyer the arbitrator could not find 
that the buyer provided timely notice).  
 230. See, e.g., Landgericht Stuttgart [LG] [regional court] Aug. 31, 1989, 3 
KfH 0 97/89 (Ger.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1. 
 231. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 25, 1997 
VIII ZR 300/96 (Ger.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970625g2.html. 
 232. HENRY GABRIEL, CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS: A COMPARISON 
OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (2009). 
 233. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 25, 1997 
VIII ZR 300/96 (Ger.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970625g2.html. 
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repairs waived the right to defend on the grounds of untimely 
notice.234 Another seller implicitly waived its right to rely on 
untimely notice as a defense by retaking the goods and 
agreeing to exchange them without making its own 
examination of the goods.235 
Most importantly, however, is the prohibition imposed by 
Article 40 of the Convention that bars a seller, who knew or 
could not have been unaware of the defective condition of its 
goods and failed to disclose those facts to the buyer, from 
relying on the buyer’s failure to meet the requirements of 
prompt examination and reasonable notice if the lack of 
conformity.236 Implicit in this requirement is a threaded policy 
of timely communication and disclosure imposed by several of 
the provisions.237 Although the Convention does not impose a 
general duty of good faith on the parties, many of its provisions 
reflect general policies that are harmonious with good faith in 
domestic law such as the duty to communicate reflected in 
Article 40.238  
 
3. Avoidance, the Convention’s Ultimate Remedy for 
Returning the Goods 
When the seller tenders or delivers non-conforming goods, 
the buyer whose contract is governed by the Code may find it 
necessary to use either, or both, of the goods oriented remedies 
provided by the Code: rejection,239 available for any non-
 
 234. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Apr. 2, 2009, 8 Ob 
125/08b (Austria), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090402a3.html (finding that the buyer failed 
to raise the question of waiver in the Court of First Instance).  
 235. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] July 5, 2001, 6 OB 
117/01a (Austria), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010705a3.html 
 236. CISG, supra note 1, art. 40.  
 237. See HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 100 (citing CISG, supra note 1, arts. 
19 (2), 21 (2), 26, 39 (1), 48 (2), 65, 71 (3), 72 (2), 79 (4), and 88 (1) (interpreting 
that the CISG as imposing a duty to communicate); Sarah Howard Jenkins, 
Construing Laws Governing International and U.S. Domestic Contracts for the 
Sale of Goods: A Comparative Evaluation of the CISG and UCC Rules of 
Interpretation, 26 TEMPLE J. INT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2012).  
 238. For a comparative assessment of the good faith duty imposed by 
domestic contract law and the interpretative guideline of good faith in 
international trade espoused by Article 7 of the Convention, see Jenkins, supra 
note 237.  
 239. For a discussion of the Code remedy of rejection, see supra note 63 and 
accompanying text. 
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conformity, and revocation of acceptance,240 which is only 
available for substantial impairments in value. Similarly, the 
Convention provides two goods oriented remedies: avoidance241 
and a request for substitute goods.242 Unlike the Code, the 
standard applicable for the Convention’s two remedies is the 
same, a fundamental breach of contract.243 The first of these 
two remedies, avoidance, is a remedy of last resort and is the 
functional equivalent of the cancellation of a contract that is 
subject to the Code.244 Avoidance reflects the policy goals of 
preserving the contractual relationship and minimizing the 
waste of resources expended for transporting, delivering, and 
returning goods. If the buyer has not obtained what it expected 
from the contract, adjustments must be obtained by permitting 
repair of the goods, seeking a price reduction, or recovering 
damages. Upon avoidance, both parties are released from their 
obligations under the contract, subject to any claim for 
damages that are due,245 and must make restitution of the 
 
 240. For a discussion of the Code remedy of rejection, see supra note 63 and 
accompanying text. 
 241. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49 (“(1) The buyer may declare the contract 
avoided: (a) If the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under 
the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; 
or (b) In case of non–delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the 
additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) 
of article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed. (2) 
However, in cases where the seller has delivered the goods, the buyer loses the 
right to declare the contract avoided unless he does so: (a) In respect of late 
delivery, within a reasonable time after he has become aware that delivery 
has been made; (b) In respect of any breach other than late delivery, within a 
reasonable time: (i) After he knew or ought to have known of the breach; (ii) 
After the expiration of any additional period of time fixed by the buyer in 
accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47, or after the seller has declared 
that he will not perform his obligations within such an additional period; or 
(iii) After the expiration of any additional period of time indicated by the seller 
in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 48, or after the buyer has declared 
that he will not accept performance”). 
 242. Id. art. 46(2) (“If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer 
may require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity 
constitutes a fundamental breach of contract and a request for substitute 
goods is made either in conjunction with notice given under article 39 or 
within a reasonable time thereafter.”). 
 243. Id. art. 25 (“A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is 
fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially 
to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the 
party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in 
the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.”). 
 244. U.C.C. § 2–106(4) (2011). 
 245. CISG, supra note 1, art. 81(1) (“Avoidance of the contract releases 
both parties from their obligations under it, subject to any damages which 
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performance received by the other unless excused.246 Although 
avoidance is similar in effect to rejection and revocation of 
acceptance, the conditions precedent to the right to avoid a 
contract are distinguishable and the conduct of the parties 
preceding an effective avoidance, course of performance in Code 
nomenclature, may have a substantially different effect in a 
contract subject to the Convention compared to one subject to 
the Code.247 Consequently, course of performance, or conduct 
after notice of the breach and before notice of avoidance, may 
pose a substantial trap for domestic parties who are 
accustomed to attempting repairs and to interacting with their 
sellers without adversely impacting rights derived from the 
Code. 
 
4. Avoidance – The Conditions Precedent to an Effective 
Avoidance 
The Convention recognizes two contextual patterns that 
give the buyer a right to avoid the contract.248 First, there is a 
fundamental breach by the seller in performing any of its 
obligations under the contract or the Convention.249 Second, the 
seller fails to deliver the goods; thereafter, the buyer gives the 
 
may be due. Avoidance does not affect any provision of the contract for the 
settlement of disputes or any other provision of the contract governing the 
rights and obligations of the parties consequent upon the avoidance of the 
contract.”). 
 246. Id. art. 82 (“(1) The buyer loses the right to declare the contract 
avoided or to require the seller to deliver substitute goods if it is impossible for 
him to make restitution of the goods substantially in the condition in which he 
received them. (2) The preceding paragraph does not apply: (a) If the 
impossibility of making restitution of the goods or of making restitution of the 
goods substantially in the condition in which the buyer received them is not 
due to his act or omission; (b) If the goods or part of the goods have perished or 
deteriorated as a result of the examination provided for in article 38; or (c) If 
the goods or part of the goods have been sold in the normal course of business 
or have been consumed or transformed by the buyer in the course normal use 
before he discovered or ought to have discovered the lack of conformity.”); Id., 
art. 84 (“(1) If the seller is bound to refund the price, he must also pay interest 
on it, from the date on which the price was paid. (2) The buyer must account to 
the seller for all benefits which he has derived from the goods or part of them: 
(a) If he must make restitution of the goods or part of them; or (b) If it is 
impossible for him to make restitution of all or part of the goods or to make 
restitution of all or part of the goods substantially in the condition in which he 
received them, but he has nevertheless declared the contract avoided or 
required the seller to deliver substitute goods.”). 
 247. For a discussion of the determination of a reasonable time to reject 
and to revoke acceptance, see supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 248. HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 287. 
 249. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(a). 
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seller an additional period of time for performing but the seller 
does not deliver the goods within the additional period of time, 
or the seller declares that it will not deliver within that 
period.250 In both of these cases, the buyer may exercise the 
right of avoidance. This latter category, referred to as Nachfrist 
notice, was inspired by the German law Nachfrist: one who 
gives notice extending time for performance to a further 
definite time.251 Here, a seller’s non–fundamental breach of 
delay matures into a basis for avoiding the contract by the 
seller’s failing to perform within the extended period granted 
for performing.252 The former, the fundamental breach of the 
seller’s obligation to deliver conforming goods, is the focus of 
this article. 
 
a. The Delivery of Non-conforming Goods and 
Avoidance 
The seller’s delivery of non-conforming goods must 
constitute a fundamental breach before the buyer may declare 
the contract avoided.253 One leading commentator suggests that 
the policy goals of Article 49 of the Convention reflected in the 
fundamental breach standard support a requirement of 
postponing the buyer’s right to determine the existence of a 
fundamental breach until after the seller fails to cure the non-
conformity within a reasonable time, until that point, he 
argues, no fundamental breach has occurred.254 This analysis 
misses the mark and places the buyer at risk in meeting its 
required notice of the fundamental breach within a reasonable 
time after he knew or ought to have known of the breach.255 The 
buyer’s notice of avoidance is distinguishable from the Article 
39 notice of non–conformity of the delivered goods after a 
prompt examination, unless the examination at delivery 
 
 250. Id. arts. 47(1), 49(1)(b).  
 251. HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 290. 
 252. UNCITRAL, Digest of Article 25 Case Law, DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
§ 6 (2008) available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/digest–art–
25.html. For a discussion of whether the seller’s failure to cure after an 
extension in time operates as a Nachfrist notice resulting in a right of 
avoidance see supra note 251 and accompanying text.  
 253. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1). 
 254. Peter Schlechtriem, Article 25, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN 
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 281, 294, ¶ 20(aa) (Peter 
Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
 255. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(2)(b)(i). 
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reveals a fundamental breach. If the breach is fundamental 
either at delivery or discovered thereafter, the reasonable time 
for avoidance commences at the point the buyer knew or ought 
to have known of the fundamental breach.256 Should the buyer 
fail to provide this notice within the required time frame, it 
loses the right to avoid the contract.257 A buyer who must wait 
for the seller to provide seasonable notice of its intent to cure 
the non-conformity may be subsequently held to have itself 
acted in an unreasonable manner. How long must the buyer 
wait? Assume the buyer takes delivery of goods that fail to 
meet the agreed standard of quality and the buyer determines 
that the seller should have provided notice of its intent to cure 
within ten days after receiving the buyer’s notice of a lack of 
conformity. Thereafter, the buyer gives notice of avoidance. The 
buyer’s calculation of seasonable notice by the seller creates a 
factual issue that may later be resolved against the buyer. The 
exercise of the right of avoidance as a result of seller’s delivery 
of non-conforming goods arises when the buyer determines that 
its expectations created by the contract or Convention have not 
been met. If the breach “results in such a detriment to the 
other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is 
entitled to expect under the contract,”258 the breach is 
fundamental and the buyer should provide notice of avoidance 
within a reasonable time of that discovery.259 
Courts of contracting states are uniform in requiring a 
serious or severe failure by the seller, such as: the tender of 
imitations of branded Intel Pentium CPUs where the adverse 
impact on the buyer’s reputation in using such goods would be 
substantial;260 or superficial cracks hidden by lamination mark 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. art. 25 (“A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is 
fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially 
to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the 
party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in 
the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.”). 
 259. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court of Poland] May 11, 2007, V 
CSK 456/06 (Pol.), translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070511p1.html; see also Cour d’Appel [CA] 
[regional court of appeal] Versailles, 12e ch, Jan. 29, 1998, R.G. no. 56 (Fr.), 
English abstract available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=280 (finding 
that notice of non–conformity was reasonable in a case involving a buyer who 
could not use the defective machines as expected). 
 260. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Jul. 5, 2001, docket No. 
6 Ob 117/01a, ENTSCHEIDUNGS DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN OBERSTEN 
GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [SZ] (Austria), translation available at 
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on tendered steel rods are unfit for their intended use by the 
buyer for manufacturing axle spindles that are welded and 
form an integral part of axles on buses and other vehicles.261 If 
the non-conformity of tendered goods is such that it “cannot be 
remedied within reasonable time and by reasonable effort to 
the effect that the goods are practically useless, 
unmerchantable or cannot be appropriately resold,”262 a 
fundamental breach has occurred. The buyer’s substantial 
deprivation may result from an insubstantial or a slight defect 
or delay if, based on the contract, the defect or timeliness was 
of basic importance for one of the contracting parties.263 To 
determine if a breach substantially deprives the other party of 
what it was entitled to expect under the contract, analysis 
commences with an assessment of the parties’ agreement and 
their evaluation of the importance of the performance.264 In a 
contract for a particular variety of Christmas trees, the buyer 
specified the percentage of first and good second class trees and 
described the quality, height, and price of the trees.265 The 
seller’s delivery of the proper quality of trees, but not of the 
requested height, was a fundamental breach.266  
A severe depravation sustained by the buyer’s is only part 
of the formulation for the fundamental breach standard. The 
test of the buyer’s depravation is subject to an exception or 
excuse for the seller: did the seller foresee, and would a 
 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=905. 
 261. S.A.P., Jul 30, 2010 (R.A.J. No. 169/2010) (Spain), English abstract 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100730s4.html. 
 262. Bundesgerichtshof [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court], May 18, 2009, 
docket no. A_68/2009 (Switz.), translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090518s1.html. 
 263. See, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] May 23, 2005, 
docket No. 3Ob193/04k, ENTSCHEIDUNGS DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN OBERSTEN 
GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [SZ] (Austria), translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050523a3.html. 
 264. See, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] June. 21, 2005, 
docket No. 5 Ob 45/05m ENTSCHEIDUNGS DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN OBERSTEN 
GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [SZ] (Austria), translation available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1047; see also S.T.S., Jan. 17, 2008 (R.A.J. 
81.2001) (Spain) translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080117s4.html (explaining that no 
fundamental breach occurred when the seller tendered 300 used automobiles, 
as required by the contract, with scratches and dents from ordinary use). 
 265. Vestre Landsret [Western High Court], Nov. 10, 1999, docket no. B–
29–1998 (Den.), translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991110d1.html.  
 266. Id. 
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reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances 
foresee, such a result?267 The applicability of this exception 
based on objective foreseeability has been characterized by a 
Spanish court as a “lack of predictability of the outcome would 
create a situation that could be regarded as a fortuitous event 
or one of force majeure.”268 Whether from the express terms of 
the agreements, the negotiations, practices between the 
parties,269 or seller’s knowledge of the buyer’s intended use or 
knowledge of industry standards, if the seller or a reasonable 
person in the seller’s position could foresee the substantial 
depravation of the buyer’s expectations, no excuse is available 
for the seller.270 
The presence of an excuse or exemption in the standard 
raises the question of timing. When must the seller have notice 
of the essential nature of the buyer’s use or expectation? The 
alternatives are varied: at the conclusion of the contract, before 
the seller’s performance, or at the time of the breach? Some 
authorities argue that the timing of foreseeability is consistent 
with that provided in the predecessor provision in the Hague 
Convention on Uniform Law on the International Sale of 
Goods, Article 10.271 Therefore, the seller must foresee the 
results, the buyer’s severe deprivation from the breach, at the 
conclusion of the contract.272 There is contrary and persuasive 
authority, including the legislative history of Article 25, which 
 
 267. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 25. 
 268. S.A.P., July 30, 2010 (R.A.J. No. 169/2010) (Spain) (quoting S.T.S., 
Jan. 17, 2008 (R.A.J. 81.2001) (Spain)), English abstract available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100730s4.html (“[Fundamental breach is] a 
system of contractual liability based on a criterion of objective imputation, 
attenuated, however, by exceptions—corresponding to the hypotheses of 
fortuitous events and force majeure under domestic law—and by a parameter 
of reasonableness.”). 
 269. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (“The parties are bound by any usage 
to which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established 
between themselves.”); see, e.g., Landgericht Ellwangen [LG] [regional court] 
Aug. 21, 1995, 1 KfH O 32/95 (Ger.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g2.html (holding that based on 
previous commercial relationships parties impliedly agreed that the goods 
should comply with German standards for food). 
 270. Schlechtriem, supra note 254, para.12–6 at 288–91. 
 271. United Nations Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the 
Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Aug. 23, 1972, 834 
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 10 at 189 (“An acceptance cannot be revoked except by a 
revocation which is communicated to the offer or before or at the same time as 
the acceptance.”). 
 272. Schlechtriem, supra note 254, para.15 n.50, at 290. 
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rejects the prior uniform law’s approach that foreseeability is 
tested at the conclusion of the contract.273 If communications 
between the parties, or other knowledge is received by the 
seller, that clarifies the importance of an aspect of seller’s 
performance in advance of its performance, or the parties agree 
to modify the terms of the contract, the test of foreseeability 
must include the knowledge of the buyer’s expectation as 
influenced by the clarification or modification of the contract.274 
“However, information receive[d] too late to affect performance 
seems outside the scope of Article 25 . . . the foreseeability 
principle presumably is designed to give [the seller] an 
opportunity to give special attention to minor details of 
performance the importance of which he could not otherwise 
have anticipated.”275 
 
5.  Timing of the Notice of Avoidance 
Avoidance is only accomplished by notice of avoidance. The 
reasonable time for giving notice of avoidance commences at 
the point the buyer knew or ought to have known of the 
fundamental breach.276 Neither complaints nor notification of 
breach constitute avoidance. 277 The following cases illustrate 
the need for the buyer to expeditiously notify the seller of its 
avoidance or cancellation of the contract. A buyer received its 
delivery of Christmas trees on December 2 and notified the 
seller that the quality of the shipment was “fine,” but the 
height was inconsistent with the specifications.278 The buyer 
requested a price reduction and the seller refused.279 On 
December 4, the buyer gave the same notice and request.280 
The seller refused.281 On December 10, the buyer gave notice of 
 
 273. HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 183, n.5. 
 274. See, e.g., App., 20 Marzo 1998, Diritto del commercio internazionale, 
1999, 455–59 (It.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=275 (deciding that the seller’s failure to 
deliver the goods on a fixed date held a fundamental breach when 
clarifications between the parties after contracting affirmed the importance of 
the date and the buyer expected to receive the goods before end of year sales). 
 275. HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 183, at 277. 
 276. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(2)(b)(i). 
 277. Id. art. 26. 
 278. Vestre Landsret [Western High Court], Nov. 10, 1999, docket no. B–
29–1998 (Den.), translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991110d1.html. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
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avoidance.282 The Denmark Western High Court held that the 
buyer’s notice of avoidance on December 10 was untimely 
because the season for Christmas trees ended within fourteen 
days, thus requiring sale in a short period of time. 283 The court 
concluded the trees would be without value.284 Observe that the 
attempts to negotiate a price reduction were not used to 
enlarge the time for providing reasonable notice of avoidance 
but rather robbed the buyer of the right of avoidance. 
Moreover, the nature of the goods and the seller’s ability to 
resell them impacted the court’s determination of whether 
notice was timely. The buyer here is in a difficult position. The 
seller has committed a fundamental breach and refused to 
negotiate. The buyer’s options were numerous: 1) an effective 
avoidance, pushing the goods back on the seller; 2) using the 
goods in its business, suing and recovering the difference in 
value by using the Article 50 Price Reduction remedy;285 
3) rejecting the goods and retaining them pending 
reimbursement of its expenses;286 4) storing the goods with a 
third party;287 or 5) selling them if they are perishable or if 
preserving the rejected goods involves unreasonable expense.288 
The trees are perishable; observe that unlike the Code, the 
Convention does not require the sale of goods whose value is 
subject to rapid devaluation but only those goods that are 
subject to rapid deterioration. 289 Christmas trees fall within 
the latter category.  
Untimely performance may also serve as a basis for 
avoidance. Such as a case where a seller fails to deliver the 
goods on the date fixed by the contract.290 An Italian buyer and 
Hong Kong seller had contracted to sell knitted goods to be 
delivered on Dec. 3, 1990.291 The goods were not delivered on 
 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. CISG, supra note 1, art. 50. 
 286. Id. art. 86. 
 287. Id. art. 87. 
 288. Id. art. 88(2). 
 289. Id. art. 88. 
 290. See, e.g., App., 20 Marzo 1998, Diritto del commercio internazionale, 
1999, 455–459 (It.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=275 (the seller’s failure to deliver the goods 
on a fixed date held a fundamental breach when clarifications between the 
parties after contracting affirmed the importance of the date and the buyer 
expected to receive the goods before end of year sales). 
 291. Id.  
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the 3rd so the buyer canceled the purchase order.292 In 
interpreting the delivery clause, the court determined that 
precise compliance with the delivery term was of fundamental 
importance to the buyer and the buyer expected to receive the 
goods in time for the holidays.293 The court held that the buyer 
was entitled to declare the contract avoided.294 The cancellation 
of the purchase order sent by the buyer was equivalent to a 
notice of avoidance.295  
Article 6 of the Convention empowers parties to vary or 
opt–out of any of the provisions.296 A Yugoslav seller and an 
Italian buyer concluded a contract for the sale of cow hides. 297 
Exercising the right granted by Article 6, the parties agreed 
that the buyer would give the seller notice of the lack of 
conformity of the goods within one month of their arrival 
accompanied by a statement from an independent inspector.298 
The buyer lost its right to rely on a lack of conformity because 
it did not give notice of the defects within the contractual 
period; because the defect was easy to discover, the contractual 
notice period was reasonable.299  
In another matter, a buyer’s notice of avoidance was timely 
when made six days after the seller communicated: 1) that its 
obligation of performance was completed, even though the 
goods had not been assembled; 2) that the delay in signing the 
final acceptance was beyond its control; and 3) that the 
guarantee period for the goods had expired.300 Notice of 
avoidance was untimely when the buyer discovered that the 
goods were non-conforming at delivery, but it did not provide 
notice until after an “expertise” (third party inspection).301 
 
 292. Id.  
 293. Id.  
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6. 
 297. Case No. 7331 of 1994, 6 ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Bull. 73, English abstract 
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=140. 
 298. Id.  
 299. Id.  
 300. Sales of Technical Equipment, (Russ. v. Austria), VAS–11307/09, 
(High Arb. Ct. of Russ. 2009), English abstract available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/091015r1.html. 
 301. See, e.g., Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5e ch., 
June 14, 2001, JDI 2002, 483, Obs. Cl. Witz (Fr.), aff’d, Cour de cassation 
[Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] com., Sept. 24, 2003, Bull. civ. 
2003, I, 139, obs. Philippe Delebecque (Fr.), available at 
http://www.cisg.fr/decision.html?lang=fr. 
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Even though origin of the defects could only be ascertained 
after an expertise, because the defects themselves were 
apparent the buyer should not have waited for the results of 
the expertise before asking for avoidance of the contract.302  
Finally, a buyer communicated the complaints of its end 
user of the non-conformity of coal delivered by the seller five 
days after receiving notice from its end user.303 However, the 
buyer’s notice of avoidance four months later was untimely.304 
The underlying policy goals of rejection, revocation, and 
avoidance are similar: preserving the contractual relationship 
and minimizing waste. A buyer’s exercise of the right of 
avoidance is in effect, substantially similar to a buyer’s exercise 
of the power of rejection and revocation of acceptance in a 
contract subject to the Code. But, these relative rights are not 
identical. Rejection, subject to the seller’s right to cure, is far 
more efficient and easily obtainable than either revocation or 
avoidance. Avoidance places the most significant burden of 
proof on the buyer. The breach must be severe and foreseeable. 
Rejection only requires an insubstantial defect and revocation a 
substantial impairment of the value to the buyer! Furthermore, 
for U.S. domestic parties who are accustomed under the Code 
to negotiating and repairing from the time the defect is 
discovered until it is clear that the seller cannot rectify its 
default, such a course of performance works against the buyer’s 
timely avoidance of the contract. The clock for avoidance 
commences at the time the buyer knew, or ought to have 
known, of the defect, and the clock stops at the end of a 
reasonable time. This time period is not extended, as under the 
Code, by negotiations between the parties. However, a good 
faith interpretation of the Convention prohibits avoidance until 
the seller has completed its proffered cure if the buyer has 
indicated that it will permit the seller to cure.305 As commercial 
parties determine which of the two regimes should govern their 
international transaction these are the considerations.  
 
 
 302. Id.  
 303. Oberlandesgericht München [OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal] Mar., 
02, 1994, 7 U 4419/93 (Ger.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940302g1.html. 
 304. Id.  
 305. See, e.g., Trib., 12 Dicembre 2001, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 
Privato e Processuale, 2003, 150–155 (It.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011213i3.html (holding that buyer’s giving of 
notice until seller's attempts at cure failed is not considered as delayed). 
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6.  Avoidance and Instalment Contracts 
 An instalment contract is one that requires delivery in 
several or separate lots306 and includes separate contracts, if 
the contracts are “considered a unitary transaction from an 
economic point of view.”307 The Convention empowers the buyer 
to exercise the right of avoidance with respect to each 
instalment. Unlike the Code, the standard remains the same 
for instalment contracts as for unitary (one lot delivery) 
contracts; the seller’s fundamental breach of any of its 
obligations for any instalment empowers the buyer to avoid the 
contract as to that instalment.308 As is often the case, the 
seller’s fundamental breach as to one instalment may create an 
apprehension regarding the quality of seller’s future 
performance of the remaining instalments. Article 73 
recognizes that possibility and provides that if a party’s “failure 
to perform any of his obligations” with any instalment “gives 
the other party good grounds to conclude that a fundamental 
breach of contract will occur with respect to future 
instalments,”309 future instalments may be avoided as well on 
reasonable notice. Courts and tribunals have held that the 
buyer has “good grounds” to conclude that a fundamental 
breach will occur as to future instalments in a number of cases 
justified not only on the quality of the goods delivered but also 
the seller’s conduct as a contracting party. If the buyer’s 
expectations in the contract are substantially shaken, or its 
ability to perform its forward obligations is severely hampered, 
 
 306. See Handelsgericht Zürich [HG] [Commercial Court], Feb 5, 1997, 
docket no. HG 95 0347 (Switz.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970205s1.html (discussing contract for 
several deliveries of Italian salad oil); see also Landgericht Ellwangen [LG] 
[regional court] Aug. 21, 1995, 1 KfH O 32/95 (Ger.), English translation 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g2.html (discussing an 
installment contract for paprika). 
 307. Barley Case, (Austria v. Pol.), Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
Rechtsvergleichung, 1998, 211–20 (Schiedsgericht der Börse für 
Landwirtschaftliche Produkte – Wien 1997), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/971210a3.html. Cf. U.C.C. § 2–612(1) (“An 
‘installment contract’ is one which requires or authorizes the delivery of goods 
in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the contract contains a 
clause ‘each delivery is a separate contract’ or its equivalent.”). 
 308. CISG, supra note 1, art. 73(1) (“In the case of a contract for delivery of 
goods by instalments, if the failure of one party to perform any of his 
obligations in respect of any instalment constitutes a fundamental breach of 
contract with respect to that instalment, the other party may declare the 
contract avoided with respect to that instalment.”). 
 309. Id. art. 73(2). (emphasis added). 
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avoidance of future deliveries becomes an option. The relatively 
few cases addressing Article 73 illustrate the breadth of its 
application. Avoidance of future deliveries was authorized for 
the following “good grounds”: the quality of the goods 
delivered;310 the seller’s demand that a price increase for future 
deliveries mirror an increase in market price;311 the seller 
failed to deliver the first instalment after the buyer set an 
additional time period for delivery;312 the pervasiveness of the 
non-conformity; a party’s bad faith conduct;313 the seller’s 
untimely deliveries affected the buyer’s own production 
processes;314 the seller’s ability to supply conforming substitute 
goods within a reasonable time was doubtful;315 and a series of 
non–fundamental breaches, the cumulative effect of which 
gives the buyer “good grounds” to believe that a fundamental 
breach will occur in future instalments.316 
Finally, not only may the buyer avoid any instalment if it 
is fundamentally flawed without having to establish “good 
grounds,” the buyer may avoid previous deliveries and future 
deliveries that are so interdependent that the buyer’s 
contemplated use of the goods cannot be achieved.317  
 
 310. See, e.g., Case No. 9887 of 1999, 11 ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Bull. 109 (2000), 
English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=469&step=FullText 
(deciding that delivery of non-conforming chemical a fundamental breach but 
buyer fails to give notice of avoidance). 
 311. See, e.g., Sour Cherries Case (Austria v. Hung.), Case No: Vb/97142 of 
1999 (Hung. Chamber of Commerce and Indus. Ct of Arb.), English abstract 
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=425. 
 312. See, e.g., Handelsgericht Zürich [HG] [Commercial Court], Feb 5, 
1997, docket no. HG 95 0347 (Switz.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970205s1.html (deciding that failure to 
perform their obligations in respect to the first installment gave the buyer 
good grounds for concluding that a fundamental breach would occur also with 
respect to future installments). 
 313. See, e.g., Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, com., 
Feb. 22, 1995, JDI 1995, 632, note Philippe Kahn, English abstract available 
at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=83 (holding that buyer misrepresents 
the final destination of goods). 
 314. See, e.g., S.A.P., Nov. 3, 1997 (Revista Jurídica de Catalunya 
Jurisprudencia 1998, II, 411 (Sp.), English abstract available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=313. 
 315. See, e.g., Landgericht Ellwangen [LG] [regional court] Aug. 21, 1995, 1 
KfH O 32/95 (Ger.), English translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g2.html. 
 316. See, e.g., Trevor Bennett, Article 73, in BIANCA–BONELL COMMENTARY 
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 531–37, ¶ 2.7 (1987). 
 317. CISG, supra note 1, art. 73(3) (“A buyer who declares the contract 
avoided in respect of any delivery may, at the same time, declare it avoided in 
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7. The Code – Rejection, Revocation of Acceptance & 
Installment Contracts 
Regrettably, unlike the Convention, the domestic law 
approach to installment contracts is complex and does not 
mirror in any respect the standard applicable for the exercise of 
the right of rejection in unitary contracts, contracts with a one 
lot delivery. In contrast to the perfect tender rule for contracts 
that envision a one lot delivery, rejection of an installment is 
only available if the value of the installment is substantially 
impaired and the non-conformity cannot be cured.318 Unless the 
non-conformity of one installment impairs the value of the 
whole contract, the buyer must accept a substantially impaired 
installment if the seller gives adequate assurance of cure.319 
Revocation of this statutorily imposed acceptance becomes an 
option for the buyer if the seller fails to seasonably cure the 
impairment.320 The foundational policies of the Code, to 
maintain the contractual relationship and to facilitate 
performance, are reflected in the elevated standards applicable 
to installment contracts. These standards protect the seller’s 
reliance interest in a contract that requires multiple 
performances, unless the value of the whole contract is 
substantially impaired. The seller may have entered into 
supply contracts for raw materials to be used for its 
performances, enlarged its production capacity, purchased new 
equipment, expanded its labor force, or otherwise changed its 
position in reliance on the agreement. 
 
a.  Substantially Impaired Value of an Installment 
A substantial impairment in value has been held to be 
 
respect of deliveries already made or of future deliveries if, by reason of their 
interdependence, those deliveries could not be used for the purpose 
contemplated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract.”). 
 318. U.C.C. § 2–612 (1) (2001); see also William H. Lawrence, Appropriate 
Standards for a Buyer’s Refusal to Keep Goods Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1635, 1635–90 (1994) (encouraging the adoption of the perfect 
tender rule for installment contracts in Amended Article 2). 
 319. See U.C.C. § 2–612(2) (2001). 
 320. See U.C.C. § 2–608(1)(a); see also Automated Controls, Inc. v. Mic 
Enters., Inc., 27 UCC Rep. Serv. 661, 672 (D. Neb. 1978) (finding that the 
buyer has the right to cancel an installment contract if the value of the entire 
contract is substantially reduced by the non–conformity), aff’d, Automated 
Controls, Inc. v. MIC Enters., Inc., 599 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that 
MIC has the right to cancel the installments because the defects had 
“substantially impaired the value of the whole contract”). 
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analogous to a material breach of contract 321 or insubstantial 
performance.322 However, the two are distinguishable. Four 
primary issues govern the determination of whether the 
breaching party’s performance was insubstantial or 
substantial: 1) the extent to which the buyer receives its 
expected benefit under the contract; 2) whether the deficiency 
can be compensated with damages; 3) the extent to which the 
breaching party will suffer a forfeiture if the breach is 
determined to be material; and 4) likelihood that the party 
failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure its failure.323 
The buyer’s receipt of its expected benefit from the seller’s 
performance is a condition precedent to its duty to accept and 
pay for the goods.324 If the loss of benefit resulting from seller’s 
failure of performance can be compensated with damages, or 
the default in performance can be cured, the breach may be 
treated as partial or insubstantial rather than material. 
Similarly, if the breaching party has changed position in 
reliance on the nonbreaching party’s performance, by acquiring 
raw materials or partly performing by manufacturing the 
goods, forfeiture may result. In this scenario a forfeiture is “the 
denial of compensation that results when the obligee loses his 
right to the agreed exchange after he has relied substantially” 
by preparing to perform or performing with an expectation of 
receiving the agreed compensation.325 In determining the 
materiality of the seller’s breach, emphasis is placed on the 
interests of the nonbreaching party but requires a weighing of 
the relative interests of both the nonbreaching and the 
 
 321. See Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging L.L.C. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
Am., 965 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (citing Durfee v. Rod Baxter 
Imp., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1978)), aff’d, 1998 WL 537592, at *1 (6th 
Cir. 1998). 
 322. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979) 
(“In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is 
material, the following circumstances are significant: (a) the extent to which 
the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected; 
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for 
the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; (c) the extent to which the 
party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; (d) the 
likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his 
failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable 
assurances; (e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform 
or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
 323. Id. at § 241(d) 
 324. Id. at § 241 cmt. b. 
 325. Id. § 229 cmt. b. 
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breaching party.326 The analysis is designed to reach a 
reasonable result in view of similarly situated parties in similar 
circumstances.327  
The language of UCC Article 2 suggests that substantial 
impairment of value to the buyer carries a slightly different 
connotation than a determination of a reasonable result based 
on similarly situated parties.328 Rather, a substantial 
impairment in value to the buyer is based on the buyer’s 
specific need, judgment, or perspective even if unknown to the 
seller at the time of contracting.329 Substantial impairment 
may be based not only on the quality of the goods but also the 
timeliness of the seller’s performance, the quantity of the goods 
delivered, or the desired assortment of the goods.330 There is, 
however, balance in the test. Trivial, insignificant needs are not 
cognizable; the severity of the depravation of the anticipated 
benefit is the key consideration. A buyer’s subjective need must 
also be objectively reasonable.331 If the buyer’s objectively 
demonstrated need cannot be cured, the buyer may reject the 
installment.332 The likelihood of the seller’s forfeiture is not a 
 
 326. See 10 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 946 (Interim 
ed. 2008). 
 327. Id. 
 328. See U.C.C. § 2–608(1) (2001). 
 329. See id. § 2–608(1) cmt. 2; see also HAWKLAND, supra note 28, § 2–612:3 
(“[T]he test is not different from that employed in the doctrine of revocation of 
acceptance”); Clemens Pauly, The Concept of Fundamental Breach as an 
International Principle to Create Uniformity of Commercial Law, 19 J.L. & 
COM. 221, 228 (2000) (stating that under UCC § 2–610 and § 2–612 the two 
pronged test of “substantiality” is the same). 
 330. See U.C.C. § 2–612 cmt. 4 (2001). 
 331. See Allen v. Rouse Toyota Jeep, Inc., 398 S.E.2d 64, 65 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1990) (holding that the substantial impairment test of UCC § 2–608 is a two–
part test which considers both the buyer’s subjective reaction to the alleged 
defect and the objective reasonableness of this reaction, taking into account 
the good’s market value, reliability, safety, and usefulness for purposes for 
which similar goods are used); see also Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller, 362 
N.W.2d 704, 707 (Mich. 1984) (holding that revocation of acceptance 
appropriate for a car missing a spare tire the buyer’s occupation demanded 
that he travel extensively, sometimes in excess of 150 miles per day on Detroit 
freeways, and often in the early morning hours and he was afraid of a tire 
going flat and of being helpless until morning business hours; the buyer’s fears 
were not unreasonable). 
 332. U.C.C. § 2–612(2) (2001); see, e.g., Graulich Caterer Inc. v. Hans 
Holterbosch, Inc., 243 A.2d 253, 261 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1968) (holding 
that food vendor’s failure to deliver goods that conformed to the accepted 
sample was a substantial impairment because they were incurable and that 
the tender of the second non-conforming installment resulted in an 
impairment of the whole). 
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factor. If the defect cannot be cured; the seller retakes 
possession of the rejected goods.333 The seller has the 
opportunity to avoid loss by curing its performance. Although 
the nature of the breach is substantially similar to that 
required for a material breach, establishing a substantial 
impairment in value is more readily attainable because the 
possibility of the seller’s forfeiture is not weighed as part of the 
test. 
Assuming the seller gives adequate assurance of cure and 
attempts to cure even with an offer of a money allowance,334 
what standard is applicable for testing the buyer’s obligation to 
accept the cure? The Code is silent on this point. If the 
standard of performance in the first instance is substantial 
performance, which imposes a duty of acceptance on the buyer 
despite insubstantial defects, the standard should not shift to 
the perfect tender rule for determining the effectiveness of the 
seller’s attempt to cure. If the buyer is obligated to accept an 
installment upon the tender of substantially conforming goods 
with a right to seek damages for the partial deviation in value, 
this standard should remain fixed and is the minimum goal of 
any cure.335 An effective cure that meets the substantial 
performance standard is also timely.336 Consistent with the 
consideration of the timeliness of the tender for determining if 
the tendered goods are substantially impaired in value, the 
timeliness of the cure is a factor in determining if the cure 
achieves the substantial performance test.337 If substantial 
 
 333. William H. Lawrence, Appropriate Standards for a Buyer’s Refusal to 
Keep Goods Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1635–90 
(1994). 
 334. U.C.C. § 2–612 cmt. 5 (2001) (“Cure . . . can usually be afforded by an 
allowance against the price, or . . . further delivery or a partial rejection.”). 
 335. See Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, 965 F. Supp. at 1013 (W.D. 
Mich. 1997) (identifying two possible standards for cure without resolving the 
issue because the tendered cure failed both the perfect tender and the 
substantial performance standards), aff’d, 1998 WL 537592, at *1 (6th Cir. 
1998) (holding that tendering a non-conforming product substantially impairs 
the remaining a value of the whole contract and the damages awarded are 
commercially reasonable expense to cover the breach).  
 336. See, e.g., S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 529 (3d 
Cir. 1978) (holding that additional requirement of timely delivery is governed 
by U.C.C., and concrete supplier’s failure to perform consistent with the 
contract schedule for delivery breached the whole contract; contractor’s choice 
to continue with the defaulting supplier or use an untested supplemental 
supplier was not a failure to mitigate its damages). 
 337. See Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, 965 F. Supp. at 1012 
(holding that tender of cure of the first installment was made within 
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performance is achieved, the buyer must accept the goods as 
cured and employ rights available through Section 2–714 for 
any insubstantial non-conformity to the contract.338 To impose 
a perfect tender rule on the seller for determining an effective 
cure negates the policy goals of Section 2–612 and conforms the 
installment contract standard of substantial performance to a 
perfect tender rule any time a seller tenders substantially 
impaired goods or insubstantially performs. This penalizes the 
seller for its breach and is inconsistent with the fundamental 
goal of compensation for breach of contract, rather than 
punishment.339 The parties may, however, avoid this effect by 
an implied term arising through course of dealings, other 
circumstances, or establishing an express term in their 
agreement, that mandates strict conformity of the goods 
tendered or that defines when an installment is substantially 
impaired and cannot be cured.340 Without such a term, if the 
seller’s cure fails to satisfy the substantial performance 
standard, the buyer should rightfully reject the cure and revoke 
its acceptance of the substantially impaired installment—the 
buyer accepted the substantially impaired installment 
reasonably assuming that the seller would cure the installment 
and the non-conformity has not been seasonably cured.341 
 
reasonable time from the original agreed upon delivery date). 
 338. U.C.C. § 2–714 (2001) (“Buyer’s Damages for Breach in Regard to 
Accepted Goods: (1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification 
(subsection (3) of Section 2–607) he may recover as damages for any non–
conformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from 
the seller’s breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable. (2) The 
measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and 
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they 
would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances 
show proximate damages of a different amount. (3) In a proper case any 
incidental and consequential damages under the next section may also be 
recovered.”). 
 339. See U.C.C. § 1–305 (2001) (“[T]he remedies provided by the Uniform 
Commercial Code must be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved 
party may be put in as good of a position as if the other party had fully 
performed”); see also Hubbard v. UTZ Quality Foods, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 444, 
450 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the purpose of the substantial impairment 
standard is to preclude a buyer from canceling the contract for trivial defects); 
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, 730 (4th ed. 2004) (“Our system of 
contract remedies is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent breach; 
it is aimed, instead, at relief to promisees to redress breach.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 340. U.C.C. § 2–612 cmt. 4 (2011) (stating that strict conformity may apply 
because of an express term or circumstances). 
 341. Id. § 2–608(1)(a). 
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b.  Substantial Impairment of the Whole Contract 
Section 2–612 empowers the buyer to reject any 
installment or series of installments that substantially impairs 
the value of the whole contract and to treat the tender as a 
breach of the whole contract.342 Comment 6 to Section 2–612 
cryptically provides that the impact of a non-conforming 
installment on the impairment of the whole contract depends 
“not on whether such non–conformity indicates an intent or 
likelihood that the future deliveries will also be defective, but 
whether [it] substantially impairs the value of the whole 
contract.”343 When does a non-conforming installment 
substantially impair the whole? Plotnick v. Pennsylvania 
Smelting & Refining Co., a case interpreting the predecessor 
provision to Section 2–612, Section 45(2) of the Uniform Sales 
Acts, provides guidance on identifying that conduct which 
results in the substantial impairment of the whole contract.344 
In Plotnick, a Canadian seller agreed to sell battery lead in 200 
ton lots to a Pennsylvania buyer, who promised to pay 8.1 cents 
per pound.345 Sixty-three percent of the price was to be paid 
immediately after delivery and the balance four weeks after 
delivery.346 The parties contemplated full performance of the 
agreement no later than December 25, 1947, two months after 
they entered their agreement.347 In a rising market, the seller 
delivered only one lot before the end of December, one in 
January, and, with a balance of 290,000 pounds remaining, a 
third in March of 1948.348 Thereafter, the buyer demanded full 
performance within thirty days, withheld the price of the third 
shipment, and threatened to cover in the open market and sue 
for damages.349 Later, the seller canceled the contract and sued 
for breach of the whole contract.350 The trial court held that the 
buyer’s failure to pay the 63% of the price of the third 
installment was a breach, but not a breach of the whole 
contract.351 An impairment of the whole contract results, the 
 
 342. Id. § 2–612(3). 
 343. Id. § 2–612 cmt. 6. 
 344. Plotnick v. Pa. Smelting & Ref. Co., 194 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1952). 
 345. Id. at 861. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. at 862. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. 
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court reasoned:  
first, if non–payment for a delivered shipment 
may make it impossible or unreasonably 
burdensome from a financial point of view for 
the seller to supply future installments as 
promised. Second, buyer’s breach of his promise 
to pay for one installment may create such 
reasonable apprehension in the seller’s mind 
concerning payment for future installments that 
the seller should not be required to take the risk 
involved in continuing deliveries.352 
Without the buyer’s payment, can the seller acquire the 
raw materials to perform the contract? Is the payment or 
installment essential for the non–breaching party’s 
performance of the agreement? If yes, a substantial impairment 
of the whole contract results. Does the buyer’s failure to pay 
create a reasonable apprehension about the buyer’s willingness 
to pay or its ability to pay?353 If yes, a substantial impairment 
of the whole contract results. Likewise, for the buyer, does the 
non-conformity, the quality or timing of the seller’s 
performance, create a reasonable apprehension regarding the 
seller’s willingness or ability to supply goods of the quality, 
quantity, or within the time frame required to meet the buyer’s 
needs so that it can pay for the contract goods?354 Can the 
buyer operate its trade or business as envisioned, producing an 
income stream to perform its contractual obligation?355 In 
Plotnick, the court concluded that the buyer’s withholding of 
the price as a set–off, coupled with its offer to pay 75% rather 
 
 352. Id. 
 353. William H. Lawrence, Appropriate Standards for a Buyer’s Refusal to 
Keep Goods Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1635–90 
(1994) (arguing that the right to cancel the whole arises from an anticipatory 
repudiation of the seller’s obligation not to impair the buyer’s expectations of 
the promised performance). 
 354. 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE , § 8–3, at 444 (4th ed. 1995). 
 355. See, e.g., Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, 965 F. Supp. at 1016 
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (material inconvenience or injustice results if aggrieved 
party is forced to wait and receive only partial performance because the seller 
has repudiated a portion of its obligation). Cf. Bodine Sewer, Inc. v. E. Ill. 
Precast, Inc., 493 N.E.2d 705, 713 (Ill. App. Ct.1986) (holding that defective 
deliveries pursuant to an installment contract were consistently corrected and 
the purchaser, during the time of the contract’s performance, voiced no 
concerns with respect to delays occasioned by the defective deliveries, the non-
conforming deliveries did not substantially impair the value of the entire 
contract). 
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than 63% of the price or to pay by sight draft, an instrument 
that requires immediate payment upon presentment, indicated 
that the buyer did not lack either the willingness or the ability 
to perform as agreed, the buyer was not repudiating its 
executory performance obligation.356 The Official Comment 
directs that apprehension that additional defaults may occur is 
an insufficient basis for asserting a breach of the whole.357 
Unlike the Convention that mandates one test for avoiding 
a unitary contact, an installment, or future deliveries, the Code 
requires three different standards. The clarity and ease of 
application of one standard on a consistent basis enhances 
uniformity of interpretation and uniformity in application 
among the national courts, produces a brighter line for parties 
seeking to resolve disputes without litigation, and thereby 
minimizes the loss of time and resources. The dearth of 
domestic case authority on installment suggests that attorneys 
hesitate to venture into the complexities of Section 2–612 and 
that the goal of the drafting committee of making the section 
“more mercantile”358 has failed.  
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Agreements for the sale and purchase of goods between 
commercial parties with their places of business in different 
contracting states are subject to the Convention. Article 6 of the 
Convention empowers these parties to vary or derogate from all 
its provision but one term. This limitation is only triggered if 
one party has its place of business in a contracting that made 
an Article 96 Reservation imposing an obligation that 
agreements be reduced to a writing.359 Other than this 
limitation, the parties may agree to opt–out of the Convention 
or to fine tune their agreement as they desire or to contract 
with standard terms that vary or derogate from the 
Convention. This flexibility is not offered by the Code. Coupled 
 
 356. Plotnick, 194 F.2d 859. 
 357. U.C.C. § 2–612 cmt. 6 (2011). 
 358. Id. § 2–612, Official Cmt. (2001). 
 359. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 96 (“A Contracting State whose 
legislation requires contracts of sale to be concluded in or evidenced by writing 
may at any time make a declaration in accordance with article 12 that any 
provision of article 11, article 29, or Part II of this Convention, that allows a 
contract of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or any offer, 
acceptance, or other indication of intention to be made in any form other than 
in writing, does not apply where any party has his place of business in that 
State.”). 
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with its inherent flexibility, the Convention offers greater 
parity between the parties on the right and obligation to cure. 
Buyers are likely to favor the right to compel its seller to make 
a substitute delivery or to make repairs that the Convention 
authorizes. Sellers are more likely to be drawn to the Code 
because only the seller has the right to cure and a buyer cannot 
insist on a cure absent a contract term to the contrary.  
The Code permits its buyers to extricate themselves in 
good faith from an agreement with a one–lot delivery if 
tendered or delivered goods have insubstantial defects and the 
seller fails to seasonably provide notice of cure. On the other 
hand, the Convention imposes an obligation of performance on 
the buyer unless a breach is severe and foreseeable. The 
distance between the parties and the resulting waste from 
shipping and handling cost alone justify the elevated standard 
reflected in the Convention. In installment contracts, the 
complexity of the Code with its varying standards is likely to be 
unattractive to the parties and their counsel. The Convention 
provides a straightforward, uncomplicated standard: 
fundamental breach for an instalment or the whole contract. 
Both legal regimes authorize inspection by the buyer and 
require notice of any non-conformity. The Code offer a more 
flexible nebulous standard of “a reasonable time” when 
compared with the staccato rhythms of examination imposed by 
Article 38 followed by notice of any defect within a reasonable 
time as dictated by the Convention. Any adverse impact of 
Article 38, however, can be ameliorated by an agreement 
between the parties defining the period for examination and/or 
notice. The choice between the two regimes should be based on the 
client’s assessment of its business model, its risk tolerance, the custom 
and usages of its industry, and its contracting goals. A U.S. domestic 
business, in an effort to establish new markets for its goods in developing 
nations, might suggest the Convention as the governing law in order to 
develop trust with parties who might otherwise fear being overreached, 
yet, include in the agreement a choice of forum that facilitates resolution 
of disputes through the use of discovery, procedural tools, and processes 
with which the U.S. domestic party is familiar and fine tune the 
Convention’s provisions by agreement. The Convention greatly increases 
opportunities for parties to order their relationship to reflect their 
business goals and objectives. 
